Understanding New Zealand 3: Demographics and Voting Patterns of Euthanasia Referendum Voters

The euthanasia referendum took place at the same time as the cannabis referendum. It attracted much less attention than the cannabis one, probably because a vote in favour of reform appeared to be inevitable from the beginning. In the end, 1,893,290 people voted in favour of euthanasia, with only 979,079 against, meaning that 65.1% were in favour of reform.

Although the euthanasia issue is usually presented as one of religious morality, it’s much more complicated than that.

As with the cannabis referendum, the normal ballots for both General Electorates and Maori Electorates were placed in the same box, making it impossible to draw meaningful statistical inferences about voting patterns. This chapter, therefore, focuses on special votes only.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
No religion	0.27
Buddhism	0.36
Christianity	-0.39
Hinduism	0.16
Islam	0.09
Judaism	0.62
Maori religions	-0.31
Spiritualism and New Age	0.14

It’s true that, as with cannabis law reform, the main opponents to euthanasia were Christians. Perhaps surprising to most, however, sentiments were not particularly strong about the topic in either direction. Although the correlation between being Christian and special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum was significantly negative, at -0.39, this was weaker than the correlation between being Christian and special voting Yes in the cannabis referendum (-0.48).

Spiritualists and New Agers, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews and the non-religious were the most likely to special vote Yes in the euthanasia referendum. These groups don’t tend to have superstitious beliefs about keeping people alive even when terminally suffering, which is primarily a Christian belief, itself a consequence of the Christian non-belief in reincarnation.

Also surprising is that the correlation between special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum and having no religion was only 0.27. This was significant, but only barely so.

The fact that it was significant reveals the extent to which materialists in general support legal access to euthanasia. The fact that it was only barely so reveals the extent to which superstitions around death are universal in nature and not restricted to the followers of any particular religious tradition.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
No qualifications	-0.73
Level 1 certificate	-0.59
Level 2 certificate	-0.57
Level 3 certificate	0.07
Level 4 certificate	-0.60
Level 5 diploma	-0.54
Level 6 diploma	0.23
Bachelor’s degree	0.69
Honours degree	0.75
Master’s degree	0.75
Doctorate	0.61

Underlining the degree to which fear of euthanasia is mostly an irrational one, but not necessarily religious in origin, are the correlations between educational attainment and special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum.

The correlation of -0.73 between having no NZQA qualifications and special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum was much stronger than any correlation between religious belief and special voting Yes, whether negative or positive. This correlation cannot entirely be explained by appealing to the fact that older people, who tend to be more conservative on such issues, tend to also be less well educated (see below).

Likewise, the correlations between having a Master’s degree or an honours degree and special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum were both 0.75. This is probably because educated people have thought about the issue more, and are more likely to conclude that death is nothing to fear, and that forcing the terminally ill to stay alive is immoral.

Historically, the strongest pro-euthanasia support has come from those educated into a scientific materialist framework. This is probably because such people have the least superstitious worry about going to Hell if they end their own lives.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing	-0.37
Working in mining	-0.17
Working in manufacturing	-0.66
Working in electricity, gas, water or wastewater	-0.24
Working in construction	-0.21
Working in wholesale trade	0.00
Working in retail trade	-0.25
Working in accommodation or food services	0.31
Working in transport, postal or warehousing	-0.42
Working in information media or telecommunications	0.62
Working in financial or insurance services	0.56
Working in rental, hiring or real estate services	0.49
Working in professional, scientific or technical services	0.74
Working in administrative or support services	-0.01
Working in public administration or safety	0.20
Working in education or training	0.09
Working in healthcare or social assistance	-0.18
Working in arts and recreation services	0.54

There are strong correlations between the average education level of an occupation and that occupation’s willingness to special vote Yes in the euthanasia referendum.

The strongest positive correlations between working in a particular occupation and special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum were for the typically highly-educated professions such as professional, scientific or technical services (0.74), information media and telecommunications (0.62) or financial and insurance services (0.56).

The typically poorly-educated professions were much less likely to support euthanasia. The correlation between voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum and working in manufacturing was -0.66; with working in transport, postal or warehousing it was -0.42; with working in agriculture, forestry or fishing it was -0.37.

It might seem strange that education level was a much stronger predictor of opposition to euthanasia than religion. After all, the ban on euthanasia was initially motivated by religious sentiments. It appears that superstition is highly prevalent among the poorly-educated in New Zealand, even more so than among the religious.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
Working as manager	0.28
Working as professional	0.70
Working as a technician or trades worker	-0.44
Working as community or personal services worker	-0.24
Working as clerical or administrative worker	0.11
Working as sales worker	-0.00
Working as machinery operator or driver	-0.62
Working as labourer	-0.64

As with industries, professions were much more likely to support euthanasia if they were educated.

The best-educated profession is working as a professional, and the correlation between special voting Yes for euthanasia and working as a professional was a very strong 0.70. Working as a manager was also significantly correlated with special voting Yes for euthanasia, although the correlation was much weaker, at 0.28.

The least-educated professions had the strongest negative correlations with special voting Yes for euthanasia. These were working as a machinery operator or driver (-0.62) and being a labourer (-0.64). To some extent these correlations can also be explained by the fact that many machinery operators, drivers and labourers are Maori or Pacific Islander, who tended to oppose euthanasia.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
Age 20-24	0.43
Age 25-29	0.50
Age 30-34	0.44
Age 35-39	0.31
Age 40-44	0.23
Age 45-49	0.21
Age 50-54	0.07
Age 55-59	-0.10
Age 60-64	-0.15
Age 65-69	-0.13
Age 70-74	-0.12
Age 75-79	-0.15
Age 80-84	-0.18
Age 85+	-0.08

Young people are, of course, more removed from death than older people. This could perhaps lead to them being more blase about the subject, explaining their support for euthanasia. Old people are significantly more Christian than young people, but did not vote against euthanasia in significant numbers. The truth is that euthanasia has reasonably broad support across all age groups.

All of the age groups from 45-49 years old and above had no significant correlation with special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum. This result will surprise the many who would have expected significant negative correlations. Old Christians seem to be much less against euthanasia than they were against cannabis – perhaps because euthanasia prohibition threatens to cause suffering to them, whereas cannabis prohibition mostly causes suffering to others.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
No children	0.66
One child	0.00
Two children	-0.12
Three children	-0.49
Four children	-0.67
Five children	-0.65
Six or more children	-0.55

One of the strongest correlations was between special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum and having no children – this was 0.66. This can mostly be explained by the existence of a strong correlation between special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum and having no NZQA qualifications.

There was a correlation of -0.67 between having four children and special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum. This might best be explained by reference to the fact that those with four children tend to be less well educated than the average, and the less well educated tend to oppose euthanasia.

An alternative explanation is that those with the strongest pro-life sentiments will both have many children and oppose euthanasia. These sentiments, contrary to popular belief, are far from necessarily Christian. Some will be, but most not.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
Yearly income < $5,000	0.03
Yearly income $5,000-$10,000	0.14
Yearly income $10,000-$20,000	-0.54
Yearly income $20,000-$30,000	-0.53
Yearly income $30,000-$50,000	-0.60
Yearly income $50,000-$70,000	0.12
Yearly income $70,000+	0.69

This set of correlations is unusual. They start relatively neutral, then become significantly negative as people become wealthier, and then become significantly positive as people become still wealthier. This is different to the usual linear pattern seen in correlations between e.g. education and income.

Probably this pattern can best be explained by appeal to the fact that the wealthiest segment of the population is also the most highly-educated, whereas the middle-wealthiest segment is the poorest educated, and the poorest segment of the population, because it is mostly comprised of students, pensioners and young workers, is a blend of both.

Therefore, the wealthiest and most highly-educated Kiwis special voted Yes for euthanasia, the middle-wealthy and most poorly-educated Kiwis voted against it, and the poorest and middle-educated Kiwis were inbetween the two.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
Born in New Zealand	-0.40

A very curious result is that those born in NZ were significantly less likely to vote for euthanasia. Being NZ-born made a person even more likely to vote against euthanasia than being a Christian did.

This is primarily a function of the fact that NZ-born voters are significantly less educated than foreign-born ones, and poorly-educated people voted heavily against euthanasia. The sort of person who immigrates to a foreign country tends to be the sort of person who is not superstitious.

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
NZ European	0.13
Maori	-0.32
Pacific Islander	-0.22
Asian	0.28

There were no strong correlations between belonging to a particular race and voting a particular way in the euthanasia referendum. There was a significant negative correlation between being Maori and special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum, and there was a significant positive correlation between being Asian and special voting Yes. However, neither was particularly strong.

Perhaps the most curious outcome here is the fact that Asians were the race most likely to vote in favour of euthanasia law reform, at the same time as being the race least likely to vote in favour of cannabis law reform. This is especially noteworthy given the strength of the correlation between special voting Yes for euthanasia and special voting Yes for cannabis (see below).

Also noteworthy is the fact that Maoris and Pacific Islanders voted similarly on euthanasia, when their votes were very different on cannabis. Just because pan-Pacific opposition to some reforms (like euthanasia) might exist, doesn’t mean that it exists with regard to other reforms (like cannabis).

Variable	Special voting Yes for euthanasia
Special vote Yes for cannabis	0.74

One of the strongest correlations of all was between special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum and special voting Yes in the cannabis referendum. This is because Yes voters in both instances tended to be young and well-educated. Most people in this category felt that both euthanasia prohibition and cannabis prohibition were antiquated laws that reflected the morality of a bygone age.

The major difference between the two is that those special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum tended to be foreign-born, whereas those special voting Yes in the cannabis referendum were more likely to be New Zealand-born.

Variable	Special vote Yes for euthanasia
Voting Labour 2020	-0.09
Voting National 2020	0.17
Voting Greens 2020	0.70
Voting ACT 2020	0.17
Voting New Zealand First 2020	-0.28
Voting Maori Party 2020	-0.21
Voting New Conservative 2020	-0.21
Voting The Opportunities Party 2020	0.60
Voting Advance NZ 2020	-0.31
Voting Sustainable NZ 2020	0.47
Voting ALCP 2020	-0.31
Voting TEA Party 2020	0.13
Voting Heartland NZ 2020	-0.02
Voting Social Credit 2020	-0.21
Voting NZ Outdoors Party 2020	-0.16
Voting ONE Party 2020	-0.30
Voting Vision NZ Party 2020	-0.23

The party correlations provide more evidence for the trends already outlined.

The parties with well-educated voters tended to support euthanasia. The correlation between special voting Yes in the euthanasia referendum and voting Greens was 0.70; with voting The Opportunities Party it was 0.60; with voting Sustainable NZ it was 0.47. All of these parties make a point of basing their opinions on evidence, and therefore they reject the “if you kill yourself you go to Hell” narrative.

Advance NZ and ALCP had two of the most poorly-educated voting blocs, and those blocs were also the least likely to support euthanasia. The correlation between special voting Yes for euthanasia and voting for either party in 2020 was significantly negative, at -0.31. There was also negative correlations between special voting Yes for euthanasia and voting ONE Party, Vision NZ, Maori Party or New Conservatives.

Considering that ACT voters tend to be highly educated, and that many of them are Chinese (who tend to support euthanasia), it might seem surprising that the correlation between voting ACT in 2020 and special voting Yes for euthanasia was only 0.17. This can be explained by the fact that ACT voters in 2020 were much older than they usually are, and old people tended to oppose euthanasia.

Variable	Special vote Yes for euthanasia
Median income	0.55
Mean income	0.65

There were strong correlations between personal wealth and support for euthanasia. The correlation between special voting Yes for euthanasia and median income was 0.55, and with mean income it was 0.65. These two correlations lay bare the extent to which the people near the top of society supported euthanasia reform.

It’s not likely that wealth, by itself, makes a person more likely to support euthanasia. More likely it’s education that does so, and since wealth is highly correlated with education it’s also correlated with support for euthanasia.

In summary, those who cast a special vote for Yes in the euthanasia referendum were primarily well-educated. They varied greatly in race, income, religion and age, but the strongest correlations with special voting Yes for euthanasia were with educational levels.

Euthanasia, unlike cannabis, was an issue on which the ruling class were mostly agreed. This is, at least partly, because the ruling class is almost entirely materialist. This materialism apparently makes it easier to see the benefit in “death with dignity” measures such as euthanasia, but does not make it easier to see the benefit in legalising spiritual sacraments such as cannabis.

This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.

If you enjoyed reading this essay/article, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles from 2021 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019, the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted Advance NZ in 2020?

The Advance NZ Party was one of the most interesting phenomena of the 2020 General Election. We at VJM Publishing were among the first to document the rise of Billy TK and Jami-Lee Ross’s populist vehicle. Ultimately, they won 28,429 party votes, giving them 1.0% of the total, and did not win an electorate seat, and therefore failed to get into Parliament.

In short, most Advance NZ voters were poorly-educated Boomers.

Variable	Advance NZ vote 2020
No qualifications	0.65
Level 1 certificate	0.74
Level 2 certificate	0.71
Level 3 certificate	-0.04
Level 4 certificate	0.78
Level 5 diploma	0.56
Level 6 diploma	-0.12
Bachelor’s degree	-0.71
Honours degree	-0.63
Master’s degree	-0.66
Doctorate	-0.54

There were very strong positive correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and belonging to any of the three lowest educational groups. The correlation between having no academic qualifications and voting Advance NZ in 2020 was 0.65, and with having only NZQA Level 1 or 2 the correlations were even more strongly positive.

The correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and having a university degree, by contrast, were all -0.54 or greater. The correlation between having a Bachelor’s degree in particular and voting Advance NZ in 2020 was -0.71, revealing that very, very few people from this demographic found any appeal in AdvanceNZ.

Advance NZ actually had the most poorly educated voters of any party. Even ALCP, New Zealand First, ONE Party and Vision NZ voters were more likely to have advanced past the lowest NZQA levels, as well as being more likely to have a university degree.

The obvious explanation for this is that the Advance NZ campaign appealed specifically to the gullible and easily manipulated. Those capable of telling truth from lies were generally aware that Billy TK and Jami-Lee Ross were charlatans.

Variable	Advance NZ vote 2020
20-24 years old	-0.43
25-29 years old	-0.47
30-34 years old	-0.55
35-39 years old	-0.65
40-44 years old	-0.49
45-49 years old	-0.24
50-54 years old	-0.00
55-59 years old	0.28
60-64 years old	0.30
65-69 years old	0.33
70-74 years old	0.29
75-79 years old	0.22
80-84 years old	0.11
85+ years old	-0.04

Boomers supported Advance NZ more than any other demographic did. All of the age brackets in the Boomer generation (i.e. those aged between 55 and 74 years old) had a significant positive correlation with voting Advance NZ in 2020. By contrast, all of the age brackets under 50 years of age had a significant negative correlation with voting Advance NZ in 2020.

It may seem strange that support for Advance NZ was so strong among Boomers but much weaker among those in older generations. The reason for this is because Advance NZ mostly recruited online, and therefore recruited many of the “terminally online” Boomers that have voted for anti-Establishment parties in other countries.

The reason for this is probably education. There are a lot of Boomers in New Zealand who are poorly educated but who lack the humility to understand that. As such, they are especially vulnerable to hysteria, especially of the religious kind that Billy TK was pushing.

Variable	Advance NZ vote 2020
No religion	0.33
Buddhism	-0.69
Christianity	-0.29
Hinduism	-0.54
Islam	-0.55
Judaism	-0.49
Maori religions	0.63
Spiritualism and New Age	0.44

Perhaps surprisingly, then, given the correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being poorly-educated and old, and given Billy TK’s preacher’s persona, there were relatively few Christians among Advance NZ voters. The correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being Christian was, in fact, significantly negative, at -0.29.

There was a significant negative correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being any of Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim or Jewish. By contrast, there were significant positive correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and having no religion (0.33), being a Spiritualist or New Ager (0.44) or following one of the Maori religions (0.63).

What explains these correlations is that most Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and Jews are foreign-born, and most Spiritualists, New Agers or followers of Maori religions are New Zealand-born, and Advance NZ voters were very likely to be New Zealand-born.

Variable	Advance NZ vote 2020
New Zealand-born	0.72

Advance NZ had the highest proportion of New Zealand-born voters of any party in 2020, even more than the ALCP. The main reason for this is probably that Advance NZ had two Maori leaders. As New Zealand First has shown for a few decades, foreign-born voters don’t like to vote for Maori leaders.

Given that the immigration system favours young and well-educated people, it follows naturally that a party with a poorly-educated and old demographic will have disproportionately many New Zealand-born voters.

Variable	Advance NZ vote 2020
ACC or private work insurance	0.78
NZ Super or Veteran’s pension	0.33
Jobseeker Support	0.55
Sole Parent Support	0.49
Supported Living Payment	0.32
Student Allowance	-0.33

There are significant positive correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being on any main benefit apart from the Student Allowance. The most extreme was between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being on ACC or private work insurance, which was 0.78. There was a significant negative correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being on the Student Allowance, however.

These correlations can be easily explained by degree of disenfranchisement.

As previous analyses in this volume have shown, people who receive the Student Allowance recipients are unlike other beneficiaries.

People on the Jobseeker Support, the Sole Parent Support or the Supported Living Payment are some of the most disenfranchised in all of society. People on the Student Allowance, by contrast, tend to be from middle-class families, as it’s mostly middle-class families who produce the sort of children who aspire to tertiary education.

As a result, Student Allowance recipients often vote like highly educated and highly productive people, despite being beneficiaries, who are usually neither. This explains why there is a significant negative correlation between receiving a Student Allowance and voting Advance NZ in 2020, at the same time as a significant positive correlation between receiving any other benefit and voting Advance NZ in 2020.

Variable	Voting Advance NZ 2020
Voting Labour 2020	-0.19
Voting National 2020	-0.13
Voting Greens 2020	-0.36
Voting ACT 2020	0.02
Voting New Zealand First 2020	0.71
Voting New Conservative 2020	0.12
Voting TOP 2020	-0.36
Voting Maori Party 2020	0.47
Voting Sustainable NZ 2020	-0.17
Voting ALCP 2020	0.68
Voting TEA Party 2020	-0.47
Voting Heartland NZ 2020	-0.01
Voting Social Credit 2020	0.30
Voting NZ Outdoors Party 2020	0.51
Voting ONE Party 2020	0.39
Voting Vision NZ Party 2020	0.34

The outsider nature of the Advance NZ movement can be easily seen from the fact that voting Advance NZ in 2020 was not significantly positively correlated with voting for any of the four major parties in 2020. Voting Advance NZ in 2020 and voting Greens in 2020 was significantly negatively correlated, at -0.36. The only positive correlation of these four was between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and voting ACT in 2020, which was not significant at 0.02.

These four correlations underline the extent to which Advance NZ was a protest movement that looked for votes from otherwise disenfranchised people.

Supporting this conclusion are the strong correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and voting for any of the other traditionally protest parties. With voting NZ First in 2020 the correlation was 0.71, with voting ALCP in 2020 it was 0.68, with voting NZ Outdoors Party in 2020 it was 0.51 and with voting Maori Party in 2020 it was 0.47.

The parties whose voters were least like Advance NZ voters were the highly urbanised ones. The correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and voting for another party in 2020 was -0.47 in the case of the TEA Party, and -0.36 in the case of either TOP or the Greens.

Variable	Voting Advance NZ 2020
European	0.19
Maori	0.63
Pacific Islander	-0.21
Asian	-0.69

The four correlations in the table above demonstrate that support for Advance NZ in 2020 was more complicated than just education.

The fact that Advance NZ voters tended to be poorly educated might explain why there is a strong positive correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being Maori (who tend to be poorly educated) and a strong negative correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being Asian (who tend to be well educated).

However, if education level was the only predictive factor, it would be impossible to explain why the correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being European (0.19) was positive whereas the correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being a Pacific Islander (-0.21) was negative.

The truth is that Advance NZ voters tended to come from the disenfranchised nationalist underclass that also produces a lot of New Zealand First voters. Hence, the presence of Advance NZ in the 2020 General Election may have been one of the reasons for the relatively poor New Zealand First result that year.

Variable	Voting Advance NZ 2020
Living in an urban electorate	-0.56

This chapter so far has already established the outsider nature of Advance NZ voters. Given that, it’s little surprise to see a strong negative correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and living in an urban electorate. Advance NZ voters are as physically outside of society as they are emotionally outside it.

Indeed, the strongest negative correlation between living in an urban electorate and voting for any party in 2020 was with voting Advance NZ, at -0.56. This was even stronger than the correlations between living in an urban electorate and voting for other outsider parties such as New Zealand First or Outdoors NZ in 2020 (both parties -0.43).

This, perhaps more than any other statistic, underlines the extent to which Advance NZ voters live far away from the levers of power. Their sudden rise could be taken as a sign that there is significant dissatisfaction with the way New Zealand is being run, and their fall is good news for the other protest parties and for New Zealand First in particular, who stand to pick up the voters.

Variable	Voting Advance NZ 2020
Working as a manager	0.04
Working as a professional	-0.61
Working as a technician or trades worker	0.31
Working as a community or personal services worker	0.38
Working as a clerical or administrative worker	-0.48
Working as a sales worker	-0.36
Working as a machinery operator or driver	0.31
Working as a labourer	0.63

Fitting with the picture of Advance NZ voters as poorly educated, there was a strong negative correlation of -0.61 between voting Advance NZ 2020 and working as a professional. However, there was also a significant negative correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and working as a clerical or administrative worker (-0.48) or a sales worker (-0.36), which are not typically highly-educated professions.

The explanation for this apparent paradox is that Advance NZ did poorly among typically urban professions in general, because urbanites tend to be “in” (the system) whereas rural dwellers tend to be “out” of it.

Consequently, there was a significant positive correlation between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and working in a number of typically disenfranchised professions, such as labourer (0.63), community or personal services worker (0.38), machinery operator or driver (0.31) ot technician or trades worker (0.31).

The most difficult correlation to explain is that of voting Advance NZ in 2020 and working as a manager (0.04). On the one hand, managers are not disenfranchised, and are therefore unlike the typical Advance NZ voter. But on the other hand, managers don’t usually need to be well-educated, rather determined and stress-tolerant. So in comparison to those who work as professional, managers are more likely to fall for huckstering.

Variable	Voting Advance NZ 2020
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing	0.54
Working in mining	0.38
Working in manufacturing	0.25
Working in electricity, gas, water or wastewater	0.20
Working in construction	0.45
Working in wholesale trade	-0.45
Working in retail trade	0.06
Working in accommodation or food services	-0.04
Working in transport, postal or warehousing	0.14
Working in information media or telecommunications	-0.58
Working in financial or insurance services	-0.64
Working in rental, hiring or real estate services	-0.21
Working in professional, scientific or technical services	-0.63
Working in administrative or support services	-0.03
Working in public administration or safety	-0.20
Working in education or training	-0.11
Working in healthcare or social assistance	0.15
Working in arts or recreation services	-0.10

When it comes to industry, the most powerful predictive factor is once again relatively poor education of the average Advance NZ voter.

There are strong negative correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and working in a typically high-skilled industry such as financial or insurance services (-0.64), professional, scientific or technical services (-0.63) or information media or telecommunications (-0.58).

By contrast, there are significant positive correlations between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and working in a typically low-skilled industry such as agriculture, forestry or fishing (0.54), construction (0.45), mining (0.38) or manufacturing (0.25).

There’s more to this than being rural, New Zealand-born and poorly educated. There’s a certain type of person who is disenfranchised enough that they turn to wild conspiracy theories (as opposed to accurate conspiracy theories) in order to explain their lot. These unfortunates are prone to paranoid distrust, which can make them see saviour figures in men like Billy TK and Jami-Lee Ross.

Variable	Voting Advance NZ 2020
Married (not separated)	-0.17
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.56
Never married	-0.04

There was a strong positive correlation of 0.56 between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being divorced/separated/widowed. Voting for a particular party in 2020 was also strongly positively correlated with being divorced/separated/widowed in the case of New Zealand First (0.64), NZ Outdoors Party (0.52) and New Conservative (0.47).

This points to a moderate to high level of disagreeability among Advance NZ voters. This disagreeability could contribute to the sense of outsidership that motivates a person to vote for an outsider party like Advance NZ.

All these correlations fill in our picture of the average Advance NZ voter. The sort of person who votes Advance NZ is the sort of person who spends a lot of time on the Internet, and who doesn’t have much in the way of competing interests such as a job or an education. A correlation of 0.56 between voting Advance NZ in 2020 and being divorced, separated or widowed paints a picture of a reasonably unhappy, reasonably socially isolated Boomer.

If you enjoyed reading this essay/article, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted New Conservative in 2020

The New Conservative Party had one of the strongest Internet presences of any party leading up to the 2020 General Election. They regularly scored 5%+ in online polls of voting intent. In the actual election, however, they only got 42,613 votes, or 1.5% of the total. This was not enough to win any seats in Parliament.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
Voting Labour in 2020	0.13
Voting National in 2020	0.68
Voting Greens in 2020	-0.35
Voting ACT in 2020	0.68
Voting New Zealand First in 2020	0.29
Voting TOP in 2020	-0.05
Voting Maori Party in 2020	-0.57
Voting Advance NZ in 2020	0.12
Voting ALCP in 2020	-0.31
Voting Sustainable NZ in 2020	0.37
Voting Social Credit in 2020	0.35
Voting NZ Outdoors Party in 2020	0.34

Unsurprisingly, New Conservative voters were similar to National and ACT voters. The correlations between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting National in 2020 or voting ACT in 2020 were both 0.68. This reflects that New Conservative is a right-wing party, competing for the same votes as National and ACT.

Although there was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting New Zealand First in 2020 (0.29), this was not as strong as any of the correlations between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting Sustainable NZ in 2020 (0.37), voting Social Credit in 2020 (0.35) or voting NZ Outdoors Party in 2020 (0.34).

These positive correlations seem unlikely, given that New Conservative is right-wing and New Zealand First, Sustainable NZ, Social Credit and NZ Outdoors Party are all centrist/leftist. But they can be explained by the fact that all these parties appeal to the relatively disenfranchised, and hence they share demographics on that basis.

The strongest negative correlations were between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting Maori Party in 2020 (-0.57), voting Vision NZ Party in 2020 (-0.42), voting Greens in 2020 (-0.35) or voting Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party in 2020 (-0.31).

These correlations are easy to explain: New Conservative voters tend to be old and white, whereas Maori Party, Vision NZ Party and ALCP voters tend to be young and brown, and Greens voters tend to be young.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
European	0.50
Maori	-0.44
Pacific Islander	-0.25
Asian	-0.21

The New Conservatives made a big deal about the racial diversity of their candidates, but their constituency was solidly white. As with the National and ACT parties, there was a significant positive correlation between being of European descent and voting New Conservative in 2020 (0.50).

The negative correlation between being a Pacific Islander and voting New Conservative in 2020 (-0.25) was much weaker than the correlations between being a Pacific Islander and voting either National in 2020 (-0.46) or ACT in 2020 (-0.58). This was mostly down to two major factors: the fact that then-Deputy Leader Elliot Ikilei was conspicuously Polynesian, and the fact that the New Conservatives in general were conspicuously Christian.

The strongest negative correlation between voting New Conservative and belonging to a particular race was with Maoris, at -0.44. This can be explained by the fact that Maoris, who tend to be younger and poorer than the rest of New Zealand, have little incentive to vote for the status quo.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
No religion	0.04
Buddhism	-0.24
Christianity	0.24
Hinduism	-0.21
Islam	-0.22
Judaism	-0.36
Maori religions	-0.38
Spiritualism and New Age	0.01

Maoris and Jews share very few things in common, but one thing they do share is a significant dislike for voting New Conservative in 2020. The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and following one of the Maori religions was -0.38, and with being a Jew it was -0.36.

The only one religious group to have a positive correlation with voting for the New Conservative Party in 2020 was Christians, and even then the correlation was barely significant (0.24). The irony is that religious people, being conservative, tend to favour the status quo, and therefore they favour the status quo conservative party (National) and not the alternative conservative party (New Conservatives).

This means that the conspiciously Christian branding of the New Conservatives did little to win the votes of mainstream Christians. The Christian fringe, however, were significantly more likely to vote New Conservative in 2020 than vote for other parties.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
20-24 years old	-0.52
25-29 years old	-0.47
30-34 years old	-0.33
35-39 years old	-0.20
40-44 years old	0.01
45-49 years old	0.30
50-54 years old	0.46
55-59 years old	0.59
60-64 years old	0.63
65-69 years old	0.61
70-74 years old	0.64
75-79 years old	0.65
80-84 years old	0.65
85+ years old	0.54

Like most reactionary parties around the world, New Conservative voters were old. There was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and belonging to any age bracket above 45 years old. All of the age brackets between 60 and 84 years old had a positive correlation of at least 0.60 with voting New Conservative in 2020.

The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and belonging to a particular age bracket became more and more positive as age increases, from the 20-24 age bracket (where it is -0.52) all the way up to the 60-64 age bracket (where it is 0.63). Older age brackets were consistently strong supporters of New Conservative.

The obvious reason for this is that young people don’t like conservatism. They are much less likely to own homes or to earn a wage that they can one day buy a home with. As such, they are not incentivised to support the status quo. Moreover, young people are much less likely to be Christian.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
Being male	0.09

The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being male was not significant, at 0.09. This was however the third highest proportion of male voters of all parties. Only voting Heartland NZ in 2020 (0.11) and voting Outdoors NZ in 2020 (0.22) had stronger positive correlations with being male.

This accords with data from other countries, where conservative parties regularly get a higher proportion of male voters. This is usually because male voters tend to have higher incomes, but this is not the case for New Conservative voters. This is further evidence that New Conservative voters were motivated by social conservatism more than economic conservatism.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
Median income	-0.19
Mean income	-0.27

One major way in which New Conservative voters differ from National and ACT voters is income. There is a significant positive correlation between mean income and voting either National or ACT in 2020, but a significant negative correlation between mean income and voting New Conservative in 2020.

This suggests a paradox: New Conservative voters vote for the right-wing, which usually favours those with money, despite that New Conservative voters don’t have much money themselves. This paradox can be resolved by referencing the fact that New Conservative voters tend to be religious and so, like low-income Americans who vote for right-wing parties, they tend to be values voters.

Variable	Voting New Conservative 2020
Not studying	0.63
Wage or salary	-0.45
Interest, dividends, rent or other investments	0.29
NZ Super or Veteran’s pension	0.65
Student Allowance	-0.48

New Conservative voters might not have a high income (the correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and mean income was -0.27), but they are comfortable and secure by many measures. For example, there was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and receiving NZ Super or a Veteran’s pension (0.65) or receiving income through interest, dividends, rent or other investments (0.29).

By contrast, there was a strong negative correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and receiving a wage or salary (-0.45). This wasn’t because students vote for them either: there was a correlation of 0.63 between voting New Conservative in 2020 and not studying, and also a significant negative correlation of -0.48 between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being on the Student Allowance.

It seems that New Conservative is, to a large extent, a pensioner’s party. They seem to attract many of the conservative old people who are more Christian, rather than the more ethnonationalist, who tend to prefer New Zealand First.

Variable	Voting New Conservative 2020
Own or part own house	0.71
Neither own house nor family trust	-0.71

New Conservative voters were very likely to own their own homes – the correlation between voting for them in 2020 and owning or part-owning a house was 0.71. In this sense, New Conservative voters also suffer from the “too much time on the Internet” phenomenon that affected Advance NZ voters. This explains why both parties got so few votes in comparison to the size of their Internet presence.

The correlation between receiving NZ Super or a Veteran’s Pension and owning or part-owning a house was 0.79, one of the strongest correlations in the whole Understanding New Zealand dataset. This explains why New Conservative voters tend to own their own houses despite being low-income.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
No qualifications	0.24
Level 1 certificate	0.40
Level 2 certificate	0.25
Level 3 certificate	-0.55
Level 4 certificate	0.35
Level 5 diploma	0.37
Level 6 diploma	0.55
Bachelor’s degree	-0.31
Honours degree	-0.26
Master’s degree	-0.35
Doctorate	-0.25

As with Advance NZ, there was a significant negative correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and having any of the university degrees. These negative correlations were not as strong as they were for Advance NZ, however.

The most likely to vote New Conservative in 2020 were those with a level 6 diploma – the correlation here was 0.55. The reason for this is the strong support for the New Conservatives among tradesmen who have completed training at polytechnic – the correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being a technician or trades worker was 0.52.

That New Conservative voters might be poorly educated is not a surprise to those who have observed similar Christian fundamentalist movements in other countries. The New Conservative’s message was primarily based on fear, and fear-based messaging primarily appeals to the poorly educated. This explains the constant hysteria about homosexuality and cannabis use.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing	0.34
Working in mining	0.17
Working in manufacturing	0.24
Working in electricity, gas, water or wastewater	0.14
Working in construction	0.37
Working in wholesale trade	0.05
Working in retail trade	0.35
Working in accommodation or food services	-0.32
Working in transport, postal or warehousing	-0.25
Working in information media and telecommunications	-0.46
Working in financial and insurance services	-0.31
Working in rental, hiring and real estate services	0.06
Working in professional, scientific and technical services	-0.29
Working in administrative and support services	-0.46
Working in public administration and safety	-0.24
Working in education and training	-0.23
Working in healthcare and social assistance	0.11
Working in arts and recreation services	-0.35

Fittingly, then, the party was heavily represented among those working in masculine industries.

There was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working in construction (0.37) or working in agriculture, forestry and fishing (0.34). There was also a significant negative correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working in administrative and support services (-0.46), being a community and personal service worker (-0.31) or working in public administration and safety (-0.24).

These correlations don’t reflect the relatively poor educational levels of New Conservative voters so much as they reflect a particularly object-orientated social approach. New Conservative voters appear to be disinclined towards working with people, and prefer working with things. This is typical for masculine groups.

Variable	Voting New Conservative in 2020
Working as a manager	0.36
Working as a professional	-0.33
Working as a technician or trades worker	0.52
Working as a community or personal services worker	-0.31
Working as clerical or administrative worker	-0.01
Working as a sales worker	-0.09
Working as a machinery operator or driver	0.02
Working as a labourer	0.07

The occupation in which one is least likely to find a New Conservative voter is professional. The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being a professional was significantly negative, at -0.33. This reflects multiple factors, but in particular the poor education of New Conservative voters.

The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working as a manager was significantly positive, at 0.36. This is primarily a function of two things. One, managers tend to be older than average, like New Conservative voters. Two, managers don’t need to be well-educated to perform in their roles, just committed.

Some might be suprised to read that the correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working as a technician or trades worker (0.52) was so much stronger than the correlations between voting that was and working as as machinery operator or driver (0.02) or as a labourer (0.07) were much weaker.

This can be explained by age. New Conservative voters, as discussed above, tend to be old. Few old people can cut it as labourers, or even as machinery operators and drivers. But there are many old people working as technicians or trades workers. The trades are well-known for appealing to youngsters on account of that many of their workers will soon retire.

Variable	Voting New Conservative 2020
Has no children	-0.54
Has one child	-0.21
Has two children	0.65
Has three children	0.61
Has four children	0.26
Has five children	-0.07
Has six or more children	-0.24

The correlations between voting New Conservative in 2020 and having children are the strongest for having two children (0.65) or having three children (0.61). This is not surprising given the age of New Conservative voters. Those who have no children, or only one, tend to be much younger and less religious.

Being mostly white, New Conservative voters are significantly less likely to have six or more children. The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and having six or more children was -0.24. The correlation between voting National in 2020 and having six or more children was, however, -0.59, so New Conservative voters are relatively fecund by that measure.

In summary, New Conservative voters represent a kind of old-school masculinity that perhaps hasn’t adjusted well to changing times. This is best shown by the strong negative correlation of -0.66 between voting New Conservative in 2020 and casting a special vote for Yes in the cannabis referendum.

New Conservative voters tend to be old, white, male, poorly educated and Christian. As such, they are very much the same demographic targeted by the American Republican Party in their “Southern Strategy”. Such voters are not as numerous in New Zealand as in America, but there might still be enough of them to get New Conservative over the 5% in 2023.

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Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party in 2020

Many thought that holding a cannabis referendum at the same time as a General Election would lead to a surge in support for the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party. In the end, they only got 13,329 votes, or around 0.5% of the party vote. This chapter explain why a hundred times more people voted for cannabis law reform than for the cannabis party.

It will be surprising for many to hear that there wasn’t much overlap between those who voted ALCP in 2020 and those who cast a special vote for Yes in the cannabis referendum- the correlation between the two groups was 0.23. This was statistically significant, but only barely so, and is much weaker than many other correlations with voting ALCP in 2020.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
No qualifications	0.55
Level 1 certificate	0.55
Level 2 certificate	0.64
Level 3 certificate	0.37
Level 4 certificate	0.53
Level 5 diploma	0.36
Level 6 diploma	-0.56
Bachelor’s degree	-0.56
Honours degree	-0.55
Master’s degree	-0.53
Doctorate	-0.44

The trend here is obvious: the better-educated a person is, the less likely they were to vote ALCP in 2020. This is similar to previous elections. What this trend reveals is that the ALCP is seen as a joke party by the vast majority of the electorate, and people only vote for them if they feel that their vote doesn’t matter.

In this regard, a vote for the ALCP is similar to not voting, in that it follows the General Disenfranchisement Rule. The ALCP is something of a joke party and so, like not voting, it tends to appeal to those who feel that their vote doesn’t matter anyway. We can predict from this that the demographics of ALCP voters are very similar to the demographics of non-voters.

These correlations explain why the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and special voting Yes in the cannabis referendum was only 0.23. The more poorly-educated a person is, the more likely they are to vote ALCP, but the better-educated a person was, the more likely they were to special vote Yes in the cannabis referendum.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
European	-0.08
Maori	0.88
Pacific Islander	-0.05
Asian	-0.53

Indeed, we can see an extremely strong correlation of 0.88 between being Maori and voting ALCP in 2020. Kiwis of European descent and Pacific Islanders were generally neutral about voting ALCP, and Asians were strongly against it. These patterns mirror the numbers of poorly-educated and disenfranchised people among those racial groups.

For many Maori people, the Establishment is implacably opposed to them and so it doesn’t matter who they vote for. This is why so many of them either don’t vote or vote for protest parties like the ALCP. Their high levels of support for the ALCP could be considered a consequence of general disenfranchisement.

However, it isn’t just a protest vote. Maori people are much more heavily affected by cannabis prohibition than other races, on account of that they are much more likely to use it as a recreational alternative to alcohol in comparison to all of whites, Pacific Islanders and Asians. Moreover, the relative insecurity of dwelling suffered by Maori people means that they are more likely to use cannabis in public, and thereby more likely to suffer legal consequences.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
Voting Labour in 2020	-0.27
Voting National in 2020	-0.60
Voting Greens in 2020	-0.23
Voting ACT in 2020	-0.48
Voting New Zealand First in 2020	0.38
Voting New Conservative in 2020	-0.31
Voting The Opportunities Party in 2020	-0.34
Voting Maori Party in 2020	0.81
Voting Advance NZ in 2020	0.68
Voting Sustainable NZ in 2020	-0.41

One pattern immediately leaps out when we look at the correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting for other parties: all of the correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting for one of the four major globalist parties is significantly negative.

The most negative of all was the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting National in 2020: this was -0.60. The ALCP-voting demographics differ from the National-voting demographics in several major ways, as this chapter will discuss.

Some might be surprised to see that the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting Greens in 2020 was -0.23. The ALCP is considered by many to be a Greens-adjacent party, on account of that the cannabis law reform issue has been pushed by the Greens more than by any other party. But the only major quality shared by both Greens and ALCP voters is that they tend to be young.

Those surprised at that will likely also be surprised by the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting New Zealand First in 2020, which was 0.38. This reflects a shared tendency for ALCP and New Zealand First voters to be both Maori and poorly educated.

The heavy Maori support for the ALCP also explains why there are strong correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting Maori Party in 2020 (0.81) or voting Advance NZ in 2020 (0.68).

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
Median income	-0.28
Mean income	-0.26

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
<$5,000	0.01
$5,000-$10,000	0.25
$10,000-$20,000	0.58
$20,000-$30,000	0.33
$30,000-$50,000	0.23
$50,000-$70,000	-0.36
$70,000+	-0.51

Fitting with the general theme of disenfranchisement, ALCP voters are considerably poorer than the average voter. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and median income was -0.28. This is actually wealthier than would be predicted from their education level, but still significantly poorer than the New Zealand average.

The most positive correlation between voting ALCP and belonging to a particular income bracket was the $10,000-$20,000 “beneficiary” bracket, which was 0.58. The most negative correlation between voting ALCP and belonging to a particular income bracket was the $70,000+ bracket, which was -0.51.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
New Zealand-born	0.69

Disenfranchisement is only very rarely imported to New Zealand. The vast majority of people at the bottom of our society are home grown. This may sound strange, especially to those who follow the narrative that being an immigrant automatically makes a person a member of an oppressed group.

The reality is that New Zealand-born people make up the vast bulk of those doing bad, and ALCP voters are often among these.

On the surface, it seems paradoxical to have a situation where highly-educated people voted in favour of cannabis law reform in the referendum, but mostly poorly-educated people voted in favour of the cannabis law reform party at the 2020 General Election.

The explanation is that the ALCP is something of a joke vote for people who aren’t serious. Many people feel that their party vote is worthless anyway, on account of that the Establishment will always win, so they protest by casting a vote for the ALCP. These sentiments did not apply to the cannabis referendum, where many people felt that they had an opportunity to stick it to the Establishment by voting for freedom.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
Living in an urban electorate	-0.39
Living on the North Island	-0.04

ALCP voters are more likely to be rural dwellers than urban ones – the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and living in an urban electorate was . There are several possible reasons for this. The most obvious is the large Maori proportion of ALCP voters, because Maori people tend to live rurally. Another likely reason is that, because cannabis is currently illegal, people who grow it prefer to operate away from high concentrations of potential noticers.

The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and living on the North Island was not only not significant, it was negative. This will surprise those who thought that most ALCP voters are gang members from Hastings and Napier. The truth is that the ALCP gets a lot of votes from hippies and “Dark Green” environmentalists, as well as doomsday preppers, and many of those live in rural South Island.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
No religion	0.29
Is Buddhist	-0.57
Is Christian	-0.35
Is Hindu	-0.41
Is Jew	-0.39
Is Muslim	-0.41
Is follower of a Maori religion	0.72
Is Spiritualist or New Ager	0.35

We can see even more evidence of heavy Maori support for cannabis law reform when looking at the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and being a follower of a Maori religion, which was 0.72. This was much stronger than any other correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and religious affiliation.

The next most positive correlation was the one between voting ALCP in 2020 and being a Spiritualist or New Ager, which was 0.35. The explanation for this is not as obvious as the one for Maori religions, but comes down to the fact that New Agers in particular consider cannabis to be a spiritual sacrament and its prohibition a moral obscenity.

There was also a significant positive correlation of 0.29 between voting ALCP in 2020 and having no religion. This will surprise those who are aware that people with no religion tend to be better-educated than those with a religion, and that ALCP voters tend to be poorly educated. The explanation is that most of the prejudice against cannabis users comes from religious people, who see cannabis use as a rival spiritual practice.

In the case of Christians, this represents a significant antipathy towards cannabis users (see Chapter 11). In the case of the followers of the religions not yet mentioned (particularly Jews), it reflects the fact that the ALCP is a joke party in the minds of many, and followers of Asian religions tend to take their votes seriously.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
Employed full-time	-0.25
Employed part-time	0.12
Unemployed	0.64

Few will be surprised by the strong positive correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and being unemployed – this was 0.64. Unemployment is correlated with many other variables that are themselves correlated with voting ALCP in 2020, such as being young, being Maori or being poorly educated.

The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and being employed part-time will surprise many, on account of that ALCP voters are stereotyped as non-workers. But, as with other disenfranchised demographics, ALCP voters often find themselves working part-time to make ends meet. Many ALCP voters on the Supported Living Payment or the Sole Parent Payment will fall into this category.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
No source of income	-0.06
Earning a wage or salary	-0.00
Being self-employed or owning one’s own business	-0.35
Receiving interest, dividends, rent or other investment income	-0.58
Receiving ACC or private work insurance	0.70
Receiving NZ Super or Veteran’s pension	-0.19
Receiving JobSeeker Support	0.77
Receiving Sole Parent Support	0.77
Receiving Supported Living Payment	0.55
Receiving Student Allowance	0.03

Some might think that, because many ALCP voters are young and because the ALCP is something of a protest party, that many students would support them. This is not the case. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and receiving a Student Allowance was a mere 0.03. This is probably because cannabis law reform is mostly an issue for those doing it tough, and tertiary students tend to be middle-class.

The two least disenfranchised categories of benefit recipients are pensioners and students. This is because pensioners usually own their own homes, and students are usually middle-class and only temporarily poor while they are young. Following from this, neither of the correlations between being either on a pension or on a student allowance and voting ALCP in 2020 were statistically significant.

The strongest correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and any income type were with receiving JobSeeker Support and receiving Sole Parent Support. Both were 0.77. This paints a picture of the ALCP as a party for those who feel excluded by society to some extent, the true protest vote in contrast with Greens and ACT.

Supporting this contention are the strong correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and receiving a Supported Living Payment (0.55) and receiving ACC or private work insurance (0.70). The mentally and physically damaged people in these categories are the ones most likely to have discovered the medicinal properties of cannabis.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
Working as a manager	-0.31
Working as a professional	-0.48
Working as a technician or trades worker	0.21
Working as a community or personal services worker	0.57
Working as a clerical or administrative worker	-0.36
Working as a sales worker	-0.14
Working as a machinery operator or driver	0.37
Working as a labourer	0.59

When examining the occupations of ALCP voters, some patterns are evident that are the reverse of patterns of people who voted Yes in the cannabis referendum. This goes a long way to explain why there was such a weak correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting Yes in the cannabis referendum.

Unlike with voting Yes in the cannabis referendum, the more disenfranchised a demographic is the more likely they were to vote ALCP in 2020. The reasons for this are complex.

Simply put, many disenfranchised General Election voters don’t feel that they have a realistic chance of influencing the election, so they throw their vote to a joke/protest party. On the other hand, voters in the cannabis referendum felt enfranchised, and felt like they did have a realistic chance of influencing the outcome, so they acted more seriously, and voted Yes.

Variable	Voting ALCP in 2020
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing	0.26
Working in mining	0.20
Working in manufacturing	0.27
Working in electricity, gas, water and wastewater services	0.25
Working in construction	0.36
Working in wholesale trade	-0.34
Working in retail trade	0.02
Working in accommodation or food services	0.02
Working in transport, postal or warehousing	0.35
Working in information media or telecommunications	-0.37
Working in financial or insurance services	-0.45
Working in rental, hiring or real estate services	-0.38
Working in professional, scientific or technical services	-0.49
Working in administrative or support services	0.13
Working in public administration and safety	-0.02
Working in education and training	-0.06
Working in healthcare or social assistance	0.04
Working in arts or recreation services	-0.04

As with occupations, a familiar pattern presents itself with industries. The more enfranchised workers in any given industry tend to be, the less likely they tend to vote ALCP.

The industries peopled by those who usually take their lives seriously don’t vote ALCP often. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and industry was significantly negative in the case of working in professional, scientific or technical services (-0.49), financial or insurance services (-0.45), rental, hiring or real estate services (-0.38), information media or telecommunications (-0.37) or wholesale trade (-0.34).

Industries peopled by those who tend to have less ambition, by contrast, show the opposite pattern. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and industry was significantly positive in the case of working in construction (0.36), transport, postal or warehousing (0.35), manufacturing (0.27), agriculture, forestry or fishing (0.26) or electricity, gas, water and wastewater (0.25).

This lays bare the reality of the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party: it’s not seen as a serious Parliamentary option, and so mostly attracts votes from protest voters. This is the reason why most demographics vote very differently when it comes to General Elections on the one hand, and cannabis law reform referendums on the other.

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