Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted Maori Party in 2020?

The Maori Party won 33,630 votes in the 2020 General Election, for 1.17% of the total vote. They have been getting a lot of media coverage recently, and have been climbing in the polls as a result, and are now looking to expand their support into previously untapped demographics. This chapter explains who voted for them in 2020.

The obvious assumption is that Maori people vote for The Maori Party, but it’s not as simple as that. For one thing, a significant number of non-Maoris vote for The Maori Party. For another, the Maoris who do vote for The Maori Party are not necessarily representative of the Maori population as a whole.

This chapter will therefore focus mostly on the differences between the average Maori Party voter and the average Maori, and not on the differences between the average Maori Party voter and the average Kiwi. Generally speaking, the average Maori Party voter is significantly more enfranchised than the average Maori, and this is characteristic of the difference between the two populations.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020
European-0.31
Maori0.91
Pacific Islander0.06
Asian-0.32

Some Kiwis of European descent and Asians vote for The Maori Party on account of general anti-Establishment sentiments. To some, it feels as if Labour, National, The Greens and ACT are all part of the one Establishment. Some votes for The Maori Party, then, are effectively protest votes. Some Pacific Islanders might have voted for The Maori Party on account of general pan-Polynesian sentiments.

The support of any of these three racial groups, however, were dwarfed by Maori support for The Maori Party. The correlation between being Maori and voting for The Maori Party in 2020 was 0.91, one of the strongest in this entire survey.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
Voting Labour in 2020-0.37-0.33
Voting National in 2020-0.71-0.65
Voting Greens in 2020-0.15-0.27
Voting ACT in 2020-0.64-0.58
Voting NZF in 20200.070.32
Voting New Conservative in 2020-0.57-0.44
Voting ALCP in 20200.810.88
Voting Advance NZ in 20200.470.63

Curiously, there was a significant negative correlation between voting Maori Party in 2020 and voting either Labour in 2020 (-0.37) or voting National in 2020 (-0.71). The least strong negative correlation between voting Maori Party in 2020 and voting for any of the four other Parliamentary parties in 2020 was with The Greens, at -0.15.

Two of the most striking correlations are these: 0.81 between voting Maori Party in 2020 and voting ALCP in 2020, and 0.88 between being Maori and voting ALCP in 2020. Considering that cannabis prohibition is one of the best examples of a colonial law that disproportionately harms Maori people, one might think there was a great opportunity there for The Maori Party to oppose it.

Some might be surprised to see such an overlap between Maori Party voters and New Zealand First voters. After all, the former are characterised in the mainstream media as far-left extremists and the latter as far-right extremists. The reality is that the former are Maori nationalists and the latter are Kiwi nationalists, and because so many Kiwis are Maori and because white Kiwi nationalists are usually pro-Maori, the two populations have much in common.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
No qualifications0.340.53
Level 1 certificate0.280.46
Level 2 certificate0.440.59
Level 3 certificate0.510.46
Level 4 certificate0.330.52
Level 5 diploma0.240.37
Level 6 diploma-0.64-0.67
Bachelor’s degree-0.34-0.53
Honour’s degree-0.38-0.55
Master’s degree-0.31-0.50
Doctorate-0.28-0.43

Maori Party voters are much better educated than the average Maori. Not only are they much more likely to have gone past high school, they’re also much more likely to have a degree.

Maori Party voters were significantly less likely to have a university degree than the average Kiwi, but none of the correlations between voting Maori Party in 2020 and having any of the degrees were stronger than -0.38. By contrast, all of the correlations between being Maori and having any of the degrees were stronger than -0.43.

These correlations reveal the basic truth about Maori Party voters: they represent the Maori elite, and are in many ways more like middle-class white people than they are like the average Maori.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
Living urban-0.26-0.39

Maori Party voters are much more urban than Maori people in general. This is a useful clue when it comes to understanding the average Maori Party voter.

Urban life tends to be cosmopolitan and therefore tends to cultivate pro-globalist sentiments. So if Maori Party voters are more urban, they can be expected to have some globalist sympathies. The average rural Maori is much more likely to favour New Zealand First than the Maori Party.

Urban areas are also where the power is, and the fact that Maori Party voters are more likely to be urbanites than Maoris in general demonstrates the extent to which Maori Party voters are more enfranchised.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
Median income-0.11-0.30
Mean income-0.08-0.25

Maori Party voters in 2020 were significantly wealthier than Maoris in general. In fact, the average Maori Party voter in 2020 was not much poorer than the average New Zealander. The average Maori, by contrast, is significantly poorer.

Understanding the correlations of education and wealth, a distinct class division within Maoridom becomes evident. The majority of Maoris tend to vote for the Labour and New Zealand First parties, and these make up the broad Maori masses. The Maori elites, who expect to be granted Government subsidies and handouts, tend to vote for The Maori Party.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
Managers-0.36-0.36
Professionals-0.27-0.43
Technicians and Trades Workers-0.070.03
Community and Personal Service Workers0.510.56
Clerical and Administrative Workers-0.19-0.27
Sales Workers-0.04-0.15
Machinery Operators and Drivers0.320.43
Labourers0.420.58

In comparison to the average Maori, the average Maori Party voter is much more likely to be a professional or a clerical and administrative worker, and much less likely to be a technician and trades worker, a machinery operator or driver or a labourer.

This reinforces the class narrative noted above. Maori Party voters are much more likely to be independent professionals or important members of the Government machinery, whereas Maoris in general are more likely to have working-class professions.

VariableVoting Maori Party 2020Being Maori
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing0.060.23
Working in mining0.050.08
Working in manufacturing0.160.28
Working in electricity, gas, water and waste0.170.29
Working in construction0.150.20
Working in wholesale trade-0.21-0.31
Working in retail trade-0.15-0.15
Working in accommodation and food services0.04-0.05
Working in transport, postal and warehousing0.420.41
Working in information media and telecommunications-0.14-0.32
Working in financial and insurance services-0.22-0.40
Working in rental, hiring and real estate services-0.30-0.40
Working in professional, scientific and technical services-0.28-0.46
Working in administrative and support services0.330.29
Working in public administration and safety0.050.04
Working in education and training0.100.09
Working in healthcare and social assistance-0.060.02
Working in arts and recreation services0.10-0.03

Looking at occupations, the pattern mentioned above reappears: the more working-class an occupation is, the fewer Maori Party voters it will have in comparison to Maori people in general.

This is most obvious with occupations such as agriculture, forestry and fishing. The correlation between working in this occupation and voting Maori Party in 2020 (0.06) was much weaker than the correlation between working in this occupation and being Maori (0.23). Similar gaps were seen with manufacturing (0.16 and 0.28, respectively) and electricity, gas, water and waste (0.17 and 0.29, respectively).

The opposite pattern was seen with middle-class occupations. The correlation between working in professional, scientific and technical services and voting Maori Party in 2020 (-0.28) was also much weaker than the correlation between working in this occupation and being Maori (-0.46), only negative. Similar gaps were seen with financial and insurance services (-0.22 and -0.40, respectively) and information media and telecommunications (-0.14 and -0.32, respectively).

This supports the tendency that Maori Party voters tend to be more middle-class than Maori people in general.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
% VAP Enrolled-0.37-0.40
Turnout rate-0.69-0.67

Many will be surprised to see that the turnout rate is actually lower for the group voting Maori Party in 2020 than for the group who are Maori. If Maori Party voters are more middle-class than Maori people in general, and if middle-class people vote more often working-class ones, then it seems paradoxical that Maori Party supporters would vote less often than Maori people in general.

The reason why can be explained by the demographics below: Maori Party voters are younger than Maoris in general, and younger people are less likely to vote.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
Median age-0.010.05
Mean age0.010.04

Maori Party voters are slightly younger than Maori people in general. One major reason for this is that The Maori Party is a radical party and young people are more attracted to radical politics. Another major reason is that The Maori Party is a relatively new party, and so has not had time to build lifetime allegiances, in contrast to Labour and New Zealand First. A third reason is that older Maoris tend to be more assimilationist than younger ones.

VariableVoting Maori Party in 2020Being Maori
Married (not separated)-0.69-0.66
Divorced/separated/widowed-0.110.09
Never married0.650.56

Given that getting married is more common among middle-class Kiwis than among working-class ones, it might come as a surprise that Maori Party voters are less likely to get married than Maori people in general.

The explanation is simple: because Maori Party voters are younger than Maori people in general, they have had less time to get married. This is also why the correlation between never being married and voting Maori Party in 2020 (0.65) was stronger than the correlation between never being married and being Maori (0.56).

The relatively middle-class nature of Maori Party voters reveals itself when comparing the correlation between being divorced/separated/widowed and voting Maori Party in 2020 (-0.11) with the correlation between being divorced/separated/widowed and being Maori (0.09), as middle-class people are, on average, much less likely to get divorced.

VariableVoting Maori Party 2020Being Maori
Own or part own house-0.43-0.32
Own house in family trust-0.47-0.51
Neither ownership nor family trust0.530.45

It might come as a surprise to some that the average Maori Party voter is less likely to own their own home than the average Maori, as homeownership is typically middle-class and Maori Party voters tend to be more middle-class than Maoris in general.

However, it can be readily explained by the fact that Maori Party voters are much more urban than Maoris in general, and urban dwellers are more likely to be renters than homeowners. Furthermore, Maori Party voters are younger than Maoris in general. These two factors explain the lower homeownership rates.

VariableVoting Maori Party 2020Being Maori
No children-0.02-0.20
One child-0.03-0.14
Two children-0.49-0.47
Three children-0.080.09
Four children0.340.55
Five children0.560.74
Six children0.590.73

The average Maori Party voter is significantly less likely to have children than the average Maori. There are multiple reasons for this.

The foremost is the previously-mentioned class differences. Maori Party voters tend to be more middle-class than Maori people in general, and middle-class people have fewer children than working-class ones. There is also an age effect – Maori Party voters tend to be slightly younger than Maori people in general, and therefore have had less time to have children.

VariableVoting Maori Party 2020Being Maori
Income < $5,0000.260.16
Income $5,000-$10,0000.380.32
Income $10,000-$20,0000.390.59
Income $20,000-$30,0000.080.26
Income $30,000-$50,0000.030.14
Income $50,000-$70,000-0.40-0.48
Income > $70,000-0.35-0.51

As mentioned in the previously discussed correlations, Maori Party voters tend to be more middle-class than Maori people in general. This is reflected everywhere, including (as most would expect) in income.

Although the average Maori Party voter was more likely than the average Maori to fall into the lowest income bands (those below $10,000), this can be explained by the fact that Maori Party voters are more likely to be students. The average Maori is considerably more likely to belong to the bands typical for working-class Kiwis ($10,000-$50,000).

The largest gap was with the correlation between having an income above $70,000 and voting Maori Party in 2020 (-0.35) and between having an income above $70,000 and being Maori (-0.51). This demonstrates that, all other things being equal, the wealthier a Maori person is, the more likely they are to vote Maori Party.

VariableVoting Maori Party 2020Being Maori
Being male-0.08-0.06

Other commentators have previously observed that Maori Party voters tend to be more female than male. This mystifies some because there’s no obvious reason why Maori Party policy should appeal more to women than to men.

The explanation is that Maoris in general tend to be more female than male. This is owing to the relatively high death rate among Maori males, a function of high rates of alcohol use, extremely high rates of tobacco use, and disproportionate rates of suicide. As such, because of the extremely strong correlation between being Maori and being a Maori Party voter, it follows that most Maori Party voters are female.

In summary, Maori Party voters occupy similar demographics to Maoris in general, which is unsurprising given the strength of the correlation between the two populations.

The main difference between Maori Party voters and Maoris in general is that the former are more globalist, the latter more nationalist. This is a function of the fact that Maori Party voters are much more part of the Establishment than the average Maori is. The more that any given Maori individual is likely to be close to the levers of power, the more likely they are to vote Maori Party.

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This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.

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If you enjoyed reading this essay/article, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles from 2021 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2020, the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019, the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted TOP in 2020

Surprisingly for many, TOP went backwards between 2017 and 2020, from 2.4% of the vote (63,261 votes) to 1.5% of the vote (43,449 votes). This was despite the fact that, this time, they had a charming and personable leader in Geoff Simmons.

The major problem facing TOP is that they appear to be a Green Party B team made up of those too weird or too unprofessional to represent a Parliamentary party. As such, they have no real niche.

VariableVoting TOP 2020
Voting Labour 20200.33
Voting National 20200.11
Voting Greens 20200.84
Voting ACT 20200.18
Voting New Zealand First 2020-0.17
Voting New Conservative 2020-0.05
Voting Maori Party 2020-0.34
Voting Advance NZ 2020-0.36
Voting Sustainable NZ 20200.32
Voting ALCP 2020-0.34
Voting TEA Party 2020-0.18
Voting Heartland NZ 2020-0.11
Voting Social Credit 20200.07
Voting NZ Outdoors Party 2020-0.08
Voting ONE Party 2020-0.07
Voting Vision NZ Party 2020-0.38

The TOP voting bloc is extremely similar to the Green Party voting bloc. Voting Greens in 2020 and voting TOP in 2020 had a correlation of 0.84. This was much stronger than the correlation between voting for any other party in 2020 and voting TOP in 2020.

As long as this correlation remains so strong, it’s hard to see TOP having much success if they stay on the same path.

Significant positive correlations also existed between voting TOP in 2020 and voting Labour in 2020 (0.33) and voting Sustainable NZ in 2020 (0.32). All these results place TOP firmly among the left.

The strongest negative correlations were between voting TOP in 2020 and voting for one of the parties with many poorly-educated brown supporters. The correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and voting for Vision NZ Party in 2020 was -0.38; with voting for Advance NZ in 2020 it was -0.36; with voting for the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party or Maori Party in 2020 it was -0.34.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Having no NZQA qualifications-0.64-0.64
Having Level 1 certificate-0.48-0.58
Having Level 2 certificate-0.44-0.53
Having Level 3 certficate0.140.31
Having Level 4 certificate-0.49-0.60
Having Level 5 diploma-0.61-0.71
Having Level 6 diploma0.300.05
Having a bachelor’s degree0.550.59
Having an honours degree0.750.77
Having a master’s degree0.660.74
Having a doctorate0.770.77

Two patterns are immediately obvious when looking at the correlations between education levels and voting tendencies.

The first is that the better educated a person is, the more likely they are to vote TOP. All of the correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and having a university degree were stronger than 0.50. At the other end of the spectrum, voting TOP in 2020 was significantly negatively correlated with having no NZQA qualifications, or only a level 1 or 2 certificate.

The second is that TOP shares the above pattern with the Greens, and for similar reasons. In fact, the correlations between having a university degree and voting either TOP or Greens in 2020 are almost identical – and they are identical in the case of having a doctorate and voting either TOP or Greens in 2020 (0.77). The correlations between having no academic qualifications and voting either TOP or Greens in 2020 were also identical (-0.64).

The largest differences here between TOP and Greens are with those at level 3 and those at level 6. TOP is significantly weaker than the Greens among voters at level 3, and significantly stronger than the Greens among voters at level 6. Voters at level 3 are usually at university, having completed high school and moved on. Voters at level 6 have usually completed a tertiary qualification at polytech level.

This suggests that TOP is more polytech in comparison to the Greens’ university, more working-class to the Greens’ middle-class. This revelation might serve to guide future TOP policy.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Being European0.410.19
Being Maori-0.42-0.27
Being Pacific Islander-0.37-0.19
Being Asian0.060.12

TOP is a much whiter party than the Greens. The correlation between being of European descent and voting Greens in 2020 was not significant, but the correlation between being of European descent and voting TOP in 2020 was 0.41.

Maoris and Pacific Islanders, for their part, were both much less likely to vote TOP in 2020 than to vote Greens in 2020. There was a significant negative correlation between being either Maori or Pacific Islander and voting TOP in 2020. This may be because both groups feel like they are already well-represented by the Labour Party. Asians were almost perfectly indifferent to TOP.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Median age-0.15-0.24
Mean age-0.05-0.14
VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Aged 20-24 years0.390.56
Aged 25-29 years0.280.45
Aged 30-34 years0.250.34
Aged 35-39 years0.240.24
Aged 40-44 years0.300.21
Aged 45-49 years0.200.08
Aged 50-54 years0.09-0.02
Aged 55-59 years0.01-0.13
Aged 60-64 years-0.01-0.17
Aged 65-69 years-0.01-0.16
Aged 70-74 years0.02-0.16
Aged 75-79 years0.04-0.17
Aged 80-84 years0.09-0.15
Aged 85+ years0.22-0.04

TOP voters are older than Greens voters in general, especially in the upper age brackets. Although the correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and median age is negative (-0.15), it isn’t significantly negative, as it is between voting Greens in 2020 and median age (-0.24). The correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and mean age (-0.05) is also weaker than the correlation between voting Greens in 2020 and mean age (-0.14).

The main difference is that TOP voters are more equally represented across all age brackets. There are significant positive correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and being in any age bracket under 35, but the correlations between voting Greens in 2020 and being in any of those age brackets are all stronger.

By contrast, the correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and belonging to any age bracket above 69 were all positive (if not significant). These correlations were all negative for voting Greens in 2020. The overall difference in support for TOP and Greens between the various age brackets is probably because TOP has a heavier online presence, especially a FaceBook presence (which appeals to old people), while the Greens have a heavier presence at universities.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Percent of electorate female0.240.16

Both TOP and the Greens are movements that appeal to the socially conscious, and women tend to be a lot more socially conscious than men. Both TOP and Greens also get a lot of votes from universities, where there are more women than men. These factors explain why both TOP and the Greens get more female voters than male ones.

Curiously, the correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and being female (0.24) was stronger than the correlation between voting Greens and being female (0.16). This is probably because a majority of elderly people in New Zealand are female, and a higher proportion of elderly voters vote TOP compared to the Greens.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Having no children0.570.75
Having one child-0.19-0.15
Having two children-0.04-0.30
Having three children-0.31-0.53
Having four children-0.55-0.61
Having five children-0.65-0.56
Having six or more children-0.63-0.48

The correlation between having no children and voting Greens in 2020 (0.75) was much stronger than the correlation between having no children and voting TOP in 2020 (0.57), which speaks to the extent which TOP voters are closer to the demographic average than Greens voters.

When it comes to having children, TOP voters are more normal than Greens voters, in the sense that the correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and having two children (-0.04) was much closer to neutral than the correlation between voting Greens in 2020 and having two children (-0.30). This was also notably true when it comes to voting TOP in 2020 and having three children (-0.31) when compared to voting Greens in 2020 and having three children (-0.53).

These differences are probably mostly caused by the fact that TOP voters tend to be older than Greens voters, and so have had more time to have children (both TOP and Greens are very strong among university students, who are mostly too young to have had children).

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Working as a manager0.05-0.04
Working as a professional0.730.75
Working as a technician or trades worker-0.34-0.50
Working as a community or personal services worker-0.10-0.03
Working as a clerical or administrative worker0.070.03
Working as a sales worker-0.09-0.09
Working as a machinery operator or driver-0.67-0.58
Working as a labourer-0.52-0.48

All of this suggests that TOP voters are generally less exceptional and more representative of the mainstream than Greens voters. This is despite that the correlation between working as a professional and voting TOP in 2020 (0.73) is barely different to the correlation between working as a professional and voting Green in 2020 (0.75).

So the truth is that TOP voters aren’t any less intelligent or competent than Greens voters, but they are more representative of ordinary people. Unsurprisingly, then, there is no significant correlation between being foreign-born and voting for TOP in 2020 (0.19) when there is a significant correlation between being foreign-born and voting Greens in 2020 (0.24).

Also like the Greens, TOP finds itself in the difficult position of claiming to be a left-wing party in favour of social change, but at the same time getting little support from working-class occupations. The correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and working as a machinery operator or driver (-0.67) or working as a labourer (-0.52) were both strongly negative.

This is the core problem TOP faces: its message is fundamentally a left-wing one, based on a supposed will to redistibute resources to the working class, but its representatives are not themselves from that class. As a consequence, actual working-class people don’t see themselves represented by TOP candidates.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Own house in family trust0.230.05
Own or part own house0.05-0.19
Don’t own house-0.120.14

The most surprising correlation is between owning or part-owning a house and voting TOP in 2020 – this was 0.05, much more positive than the -0.19 between owning or part-owning a house and voting Greens in 2020. This is mostly a function of the fact that TOP voters are significantly older than Greens voters, because homeownership rates increase sharply as age increases.

It’s also a function of another correlation that will surprise many – the negative correlation of -0.15 between living on the North Island and voting TOP in 2020. It’s easier to own a home on the South Island because houses are cheaper, but, despite that the housing crisis is not as desperate there, South Islanders are more willing to vote TOP. This suggests that many TOP voters cast their vote out of concern for the national housing situation, and not out of mere self-interest.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Living in an urban electorate0.280.30

Some might think that the differences in homeownership rates could be explained by a rural bias on the part of TOP voters. After all, the Greens are known to be a highly urban party and urban dwellers are much less likely to own their own homes.

However, TOP voters and Green voters are almost identical when it comes to the proportion of them who live in an urban electorate. Therefore, it’s more likely that the differences in homeownership rates are a function of the greater age of TOP voters.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Income less than $5,000-0.22-0.01
Income between $5,000 and $10,0000.120.34
Income between $10,000 and $20,000-0.42-0.37
Income between $20,000 and $30,000-0.26-0.37
Income between $30,000 and $50,000-0.43-0.52
Income between $50,000 and $70,0000.12-0.04
Income greater than $70,0000.560.52

If the biggest problem faced by the Greens is that they are full of middle-class people claiming to represent the working class, TOP has that same problem, only bigger.

Both TOP and the Greens do very poorly among working-class Kiwis. All of the correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and being in an income band between $10,000 and $50,000 were significantly negative. The most strongly negative correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and being in any income band was -0.43, with the $30,000-$50,000 band, where minimum wage workers working 35-40 hour weeks will be.

On the other hand, there was a correlation of 0.56 between voting TOP in 2020 and having an income of $70,000 or more. This was even higher than the 0.52 between voting Greens in 2020 and having such an income. This means that TOP voters are disproportionately highly-educated professionals.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Receiving NZ Super or Veteran’s Pension0.01-0.20
Receiving Jobseeker Support-0.45-0.27
Receiving Sole Parent Support-0.47-0.31
Receiving Supported Living Payment-0.11-0.06
Receiving Student Allowance0.430.54

TOP gets many of its votes from university students: the correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and receiving a Student Allowance was 0.43, much stronger than for any other benefit type. The correlation between voting Greens in 2020 and receiving a Student Allowance was notably stronger, at 0.54.

A higher proportion of TOP voters were pensioners, though, in comparison to the Greens. The correlation between receiving NZ Super or a Veteran’s Pension and voting TOP in 2020 was 0.01, in comparison to -0.20 with voting Greens in 2020. This reflects the fact that the correlations between being in any age bracket above 70 years old and voting TOP in 2020 were all positive, but the same correlations with voting Greens in 2020 were all negative.

VariableVoting TOP 2020Voting Greens 2020
Not religious0.380.31
Is a Buddhist0.140.22
Is a Christian-0.31-0.39
Is a Hindu-0.050.09
Is a Jew0.460.54
Is a Muslim-0.040.10
Is a follower of the Maori religions-0.45-0.30
Is a Spiritualist or New Ager0.310.34

TOP voters are so similar to Greens voters that similarities remain even when you divide them both into religions.

The greatest difference between voting TOP in 2020 and voting Greens in 2020 was with followers of the Maori religions (-0.45 and -0.30, respectively). This is a small difference and can be easily explained by the fact that TOP and Greens voters tend to be from enfranchised classes and followers of Maori religions tend to be from disenfranchised classes.

The differences between voting TOP in 2020 and voting Greens in 2020 was even less when it came to followers of other religions.

The strongest positive correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and religious category were with Jews (0.46), people with no religion (0.38) and Spiritualists and New Agers (0.31). The first two can be easily explained by the strong correlations between being in those categories and working as a professional. Spiritualists and New Agers might choose TOP because they consider them the closest thing to a revolutionary party that might usher in a new age.

In summary, TOP voters are similar to Greens voters, only older, whiter, wealthier, more female and generally more mainstream.

*

This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.

*

If you enjoyed reading this essay/article, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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If you would like to support our work in other ways, please consider subscribing to our SubscribeStar fund. Even better, buy any one of our books!

Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted New Zealand First in 2020

The New Zealand First Party were polling poorly in the lead-up to the 2020 General Election, and they did not recover on the night. Their 75,020 votes comprised 2.6% of the party vote, not enough to win representation in Parliament. With that, Winston Peters disappeared, perhaps for the last time.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
European0.27
Maori0.32
Pacific Islander-0.18
Asian-0.55

The most important thing to note about New Zealand First is that it is (or, at least, pretends to be) a nationalist party. As such, it appeals to demographic groups in proportion to how Kiwi those groups are. So the more loyalty a person has to overseas interests, the less likely they are to vote New Zealand First.

Almost all Maori voters were born in New Zealand, which is why the correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and belonging to a particular race was the most strongly positive in the case of Maoris (0.32). The next most positive correlation was with Europeans (0.27), and the strongest negative correlation was with Asians (-0.55).

This closely mirrors the depth of the roots that each of those groups has in New Zealand. It’s fair to say that, the deeper one’s roots, the deeper the nationalist sentiments, and so the more likely one is to vote New Zealand First.

Variable% of electors NZ-born
Voting New Zealand First in 20200.55
Voting ALCP in 20200.69
Voting Advance NZ in 20200.72
Voting Labour in 2020-0.05
Voting National in 2020-0.24
Voting Greens in 2020-0.24
Voting ACT in 2020-0.01
Voting TEA Party in 2020-0.75

Underlying New Zealand First’s nationalist credentials are a high proportion of NZ-born voters. No party got both more votes than New Zealand First and a higher proportion of New Zealand-born voters in 2020.

The only parties to get a higher proportion of New Zealand-born voters were the ALCP and the Advance NZ parties, who, like New Zealand First, are heavily supported by disenfranchised people. The globalist parties, like National, Greens and the TEA Party, were the opposite to New Zealand First by this measure.

Some might be surprised that the correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and being born in New Zealand was not higher. After all, very few foreigners vote for nationalist parties anywhere. The explanation is that New Zealand First voters tend to be disadvantaged, which means they are often forced to live alongside cheap labour imports and refugees, who almost never vote for nationalists.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
No qualifications0.51
Level 1 certificate0.59
Level 2 certificate0.49
Level 3 certificate-0.13
Level 4 certificate0.62
Level 5 diploma0.37
Level 6 diploma-0.00
Bachelor’s degree-0.55
Honours degree-0.46
Master’s degree-0.50
Doctorate-0.34

New Zealand First voters in 2020 tended to be poorly educated. There was a significant negative correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and having any of the university degrees. These correlations were much weaker than in 2017, when all four correlations (between voting New Zealand First and having a degree) were around -0.70.

The strongest support for New Zealand First came from older people with School Certificate (Level 1 certificate) and younger people who have completed a polytechnic course (Level 4 certificate). This tells us that nationalist sentiments were more common among working class voters.

This set of correlations can best be explained by the fact that a large proportion of New Zealand First voters are rural and Maori, two groups that tend to be less educated than others.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
Working as a manager0.10
Working as a professional-0.41
Working as a technician or trades worker0.28
Working as a community or personal services worker0.31
Working as a clerical or administrative worker-0.27
Working as a sales worker-0.32
Working as a machinery operator or driver0.17
Working as a labourer0.36
VariableVoting New Zealand First 2020
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing0.44
Working in mining0.18
Working in manufacturing0.09
Working in electricity, gas, water and waste services0.33
Working in construction0.29
Working in wholesale trade-0.39
Working in retail trade0.07
Working in accommodation and food services-0.16
Working in transport, postal and warehousing-0.03
Working in information media and telecommunications-0.45
Working in financial and insurance services-0.50
Working in rental, hiring and real estate services-0.15
Working in professional, scientific and technical services-0.50
Working in administrative and support services-0.25
Working in public administration and safety0.00
Working in education and training0.02
Working in healthcare and social assistance0.34
Working in arts and recreation services-0.15
Working in other services0.31

There was a significant positive correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and working as a technician or trades worker (0.28), as a labourer (0.36), or working in agriculture, forestry or fishing (0.44), electricity, gas, water and waste services (0.33) or construction (0.29). In other words, there was significant New Zealand First support among typical working-class people.

This can be easily explained with reference to the fact that working-class Kiwis are the big losers from mass immigration, which drives down their wages and drives up their rent. As such, working-class Kiwis are much more likely to support nationalist – and thereby anti-immigration – sentiments than middle-class ones.

There were significant negative correlations between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and working as a professional (-0.41) or working in professional, scientific and technical services (-0.50). This reflects the fact that nationalism often doesn’t appeal to the highly educated, who see it as potentially restricting their freedom to travel and to ply their trade in new places.

It’s necessary to note, however, that a high proportion of people working in professional industries are foreign-born. It might be that middle-class Kiwis are just as likely as working-class ones to be nationalists, but because the overwhelming majority of immigrants are middle-class and not nationalists (at least not Kiwi nationalists), middle-class people, taken as a whole, are not nationalists.

Contrary to the perception that New Zealand First voters are all selfish bigots, there were significant positive correlations between voting for them in 2020 and working as a community or personal services worker (0.31) or working in healthcare and social assistance (0.34). Selfish people don’t tend to choose occupations or industries where helping other people is the focus.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
No children-0.52
One child-0.34
Two children0.14
Three children0.55
Four children0.60
Five children0.45
Six or more children0.32

Being nationalists, it follows that New Zealand First supporters like to breed. The correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and family size was strongest with those who have four children (0.60). There were also significant positive correlations between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and having three children (0.55), five children (0.45) or six or more children (0.32).

On the other hand, there was a significant negative correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and having no children (-0.52) or only one child (-0.34).

These correlations can best be explained by reference to the fact that New Zealand First voters tend to be rural, Maori and poorly-educated, which are three factors suggesting a higher-than-usual birthrate. Moreover, the sort of person who moves to a big city and does not have children is almost invariably attracted by globalist ideals.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
Is married0.02
Is divorced/separated/widowed0.64
Has never married-0.23

One of the harder-to-explain correlations between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and another demographic variable is that with being divorced/separated/widowed, which was 0.64. It’s not immediately apparent why nationalists who have large families would so often be divorced or separated.

The most plausible reason is that New Zealand First has been highly demonised in the mainstream media and in popular consciousness, and therefore attracts an unusually high proportion of disagreeable people, the agreeable ones having fallen in behind the mainstream parties. As there is a correlation between being disagreeable and getting divorced, disagreeableness could explain the high divorce rates of New Zealand First voters in 2020.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
Lives in an urban electorate-0.43
Lives on North Island0.10
Is male-0.00

New Zealand First had strong rural support in 2020. A correlation of -0.43 between living in an urban electorate and voting New Zealand First in 2020 was as strong as the correlation between living in an urban electorate and voting NZ Outdoors Party in 2020, and was exceeded only by voting Advance NZ in 2020 (-0.56).

The slight North Island bias of New Zealand First voters was not significant, and probably reflected Winston Peters’ personal support in his home electorate, rather than an actual North Island bias. It is probably not the influence of a higher proportion of Maori voters on the North Island, because there is a higher proportion of Pacific Island and Asian voters on the North Island as well.

New Zealand First voters tend to be sterotyped as angry men, but the correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and being male was -0.00, i.e. non-existent. Popular consciousness refuses to accept the extent to which nationalism and anti-globalism are supported by women. The voters of actual far-right parties, such as ACT and New Conservative, had a pro-male bias in 2020, whereas New Zealand First voters did not.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
Receiving NZ Super or Veteran’s pension0.47
Receiving Jobseeker Support0.34
Receiving Sole Parent Support0.24
Receiving Supported Living Payment0.25
Receiving Student Allowance-0.31

New Zealand First voters are often characterised as angry pensioners who can’t handle change. This perception fits nicely with the stereotype of nationalists as elderly bigots. There might be some truth in this, but it’s misleading.

For one thing, the correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and being on a pension was 0.47, which is significant but not particularly strong. The correlations between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and being on other benefits were also significant: with being on Jobseeker Support it was 0.34, and with being on Sole Parent Support it was 0.24. Very few people on Sole Parent Support are elderly.

For another, the correlation between being on a pension and voting ACT in 2020 was 0.72, with voting New Conservative it was 0.65 and with voting National in 2020 it was 0.64. So the elderly bigot segment of the population would apparently much rather vote for right-wing parties led by whites than for a centrist party led by a Maori.

VariableVoting New Zealand First in 2020
Aged 20-24-0.44
Aged 25-29-0.47
Aged 30-34-0.50
Aged 35-39-0.57
Aged 40-44-0.40
Aged 45-49-0.09
Aged 50-540.18
Aged 55-590.44
Aged 60-640.44
Aged 65-690.45
Aged 70-740.43
Aged 75-790.39
Aged 80-840.31
Aged 85+0.19

New Zealand First voters are, true to stereotype, significantly older than average. There was a significant negative correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and belonging to any age group under 45 years of age, and there was a significant positive correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and belonging to any age group between 55 and 84.

These correlations are, however, not as strong as those between voting for other parties.

The strongest positive correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and belonging to any age group was with those aged 65-69. The correlation in this instance was 0.45. But the correlation between being in this age group and voting ACT in 2020 was much stronger, at 0.77. The correlations between being in this age group and voting National in 2020 (0.67) or voting New Conservative in 2020 (0.61) were also stronger.

In fact, the correlations between being in any age group above 45 years of age and voting National in 2020 were stronger than any of the correlations between being in those age groups and voting New Zealand First in 2020. So New Zealand First’s reputation as a pensioner’s party is mostly unfounded. The reality is that pensioners tend to be wealthy, on account of having much longer than average to accumulate wealth, and wealthy people prefer National to New Zealand First.

VariableVoting New Zealand First 2020
No religion0.18
Being a Buddhist-0.55
Being a Christian-0.09
Being a Hindu-0.41
Being a Muslim-0.43
Being a Jew-0.37
Following Maori religions0.36
Following Spiritualism or New Age religions0.35

Further proof that New Zealand First voters are not from the political establishment comes from the correlations between voting for them in 2020 and religion.

Highly telling is the negative (if not significant) correlation between voting New Zealand First in 2020 and being a Christian. This was -0.09. Given how many Christians are in positions of power in New Zealand, the fact that few of them vote New Zealand First reveals the extent to which New Zealand First is an anti-Establishment party.

The most strongly negative correlations between being religious and voting New Zealand First in 2020 were with being a Buddhist (-0.55), being a Muslim (-0.43), being a Hindu (-0.41) and being a Jew (-0.37). This can be easily explained by reference to the fact that people in these four groups tend to be immigrants, and therefore do not possess nationalist sentiments.

The most strongly positive correlations between being religious and voting New Zealand First in 2020 were with the Maori religions (0.36) and with Spiritualism and New Age beliefs (0.35). The former can be easily explained by the heavy Maori support for New Zealand First. The latter can be explained by the fact that many New Zealand First voters feel like outcasts in a globalist system, and people who follow Spiritualism and New Age beliefs are also usually outside the mainstream.

In summary, New Zealand First voters are a cross-section of salt-of-the-Earth working-class Kiwis. They like to have children, don’t like to live in big cities and don’t care much about higher education. Most of them belong to similar demographics as Labour voters, but are put off by Labour’s pandering to globalist interests.

The stereotypes about them carry a grain of truth, in that New Zealand First voters tend to be older than average, but are grossly misleading in the main. For one thing, Maoris vote New Zealand First more than white people do; for another, New Zealand First voters are much more likely to be family people than crotchety old bigots.

The best hope for New Zealand First in the 2023 General Election is possibly that disaffection with Labour’s Maori Caucus sees many Maori voters switch to New Zealand First. Labour gets far more Maori votes (by absolute measure) than either The Maori Party or New Zealand First, and if New Zealand First can pick up most of those Maori voters who have abandoned Labour since 2020 they could get over 5% in the 2023 General Election.

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This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.

*

If you enjoyed reading this essay/article, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted ACT in 2020?

The ACT Party won a mere 13,075 votes in 2017, barely more than the joke parties. But in 2020 it won 219,031 votes. This 16-fold increase radically changed the composition of the ACT voting demographic.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017
European0.740.16
Maori-0.58-0.51
Pacific Islander-0.58-0.23
Asian-0.200.46

The main reason for the massive increase in ACT support from 2017 to 2020 was wealthy, old white people abandoning the National Party, but not abandoning the right wing. The correlation between being of European descent and voting ACT in 2017 was not significant, at 0.17. By 2020 this correlation had leapt to 0.74, which means that ACT now has the whitest supporters of any registered party, even whiter than New Conservatives.

Maoris were heavily disinclined to vote ACT in 2017 as well as 2020, and in 2020 the correlation between being a Pacific Islander and voting ACT was -0.51. This reflects the extent to which ACT policy disfavours the impoverished. Generally speaking, ACT appeals most to wealthy people who don’t want to be taxed.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017
Voting Labour same year-0.12-0.62
Voting National same year0.920.61
Voting Greens same year-0.080.17
Voting New Zealand First same year0.18-0.34
Voting Maori Party same year-0.64-0.42
Voting ALCP same year-0.48-0.52
Voting The Opportunities Party same year0.180.03
Voting New Conservative/Conservative same year0.680.04

That these new voters came predominantly from National is apparent when one looks at the strength of the correlation between voting National in 2020 and voting ACT in 2020: 0.92. This is much stronger than in 2017, when it was 0.61, or 2014, when it was 0.40. In 2020, ACT voters and National voters were from extremely similar demographics.

In fact, the correlation between voting ACT in 2020 and voting National in 2020 is so strong that the two voting demographics are close to identical. There were also strong correlations between voting ACT in 2020 and voting for the other parties whose demographics are wealthy, old and white (i.e. enfranchised), such as New Conservative (0.68) and Sustainable NZ (0.54).

Unsurprisingly, then, there were strong negative correlations between voting ACT and voting for the young, poor and brown parties, such as the Maori Party (-0.64) Vision NZ (-0.60) and ALCP (-0.48).

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017
Aged 20-24-0.510.18*
Aged 25-29-0.440.18*
Aged 30-34-0.340.36**
Aged 35-39-0.220.36**
Aged 40-440.150.36**
Aged 45-490.580.36**
Aged 50-540.730.17***
Aged 55-590.780.17***
Aged 60-640.790.17***
Aged 65-690.770.11****
Aged 70-740.760.11****
Aged 75-790.740.11****
Aged 80-840.680.11****
Aged 85+0.630.11****

The ACT Party also got much older in 2020. In 2014, the correlation between median age and voting ACT was 0.02. By 2017, it had increased to 0.26. By 2020, it had increased to 0.54 – stronger than the correlation between median age and voting National that year.

Most notably, the correlation between voting ACT in 2017 and being aged 65+ was 0.11, but the correlations between voting ACT in 2020 and belonging to any age bracket above 65 were all at least 0.63. The ACT demographic of today is much, much older than the demographic of even a few years back. Whether this reflects a permanent shift or just a temporary change in sentiments remains to be seen.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017
No qualifications-0.12-0.73
Level 1 certificate0.20-0.59
Level 2 certificate0.05-0.50
Level 3 certificate-0.660.25*
Level 4 certificate0.090.25*
Level 5 diploma0.020.50**
Level 6 diploma0.790.50**
Bachelor’s degree0.030.70
Honours degree0.160.58
Master’s degree0.030.65
Doctorate0.110.51

The easy assumption up until now was that the ACT Party appealed to a younger, more educated and more liberal demographic than National. This assumption used to be accurate, but by 2020 it no longer was. The ACT Party got so many votes from core National supporters that the two voting blocs are barely distinguishable when it comes to age, race, education or wealth.

By 2020, the average ACT voter was not significantly more likely than the average person to hold a university degree. This was a massive change from 2017. The correlation between holding a bachelor’s degree and voting ACT collapsed from 2017 (when it was 0.70) to 2020 (when it was 0.03). The correlations for other degrees fell by lesser, but still large, amounts.

In 2017 it was highly unlikely that a person with no NZQA qualifications would vote ACT – the correlation between the two was -0.73. But by 2020 that correlation had come in to -0.12. 2017’s ACT was heavily disproportionately supported by educated people. 2020’s ACT was much closer to broadly representative of the various education levels.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017
Living in an urban electorate-0.230.37

One of the main reasons for the increase in ACT support from 2017 to 2020 was their support of firearms rights. Many of the new ACT voters were rural firearms enthusiasts. This is evident from the fact that the correlation between living in an urban electorate and voting ACT switched from a significantly positive correlation in 2017 (0.37) to a borderline significantly negative correlation of -0.23 in 2020.

VariableVoting ACT 2020
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing0.43
Working in mining0.20
Working in manufacturing-0.15
Working in electricity, gas, water and waste services-0.10
Working in construction0.11
Working in wholesale trade-0.05
Working in retail trade0.03
Working in accommodation and food services-0.08
Working in transport, postal and warehousing-0.58
Working in information media and telecommunications-0.21
Working in financial and insurance services-0.04
Working in rental, hiring and real estate services0.47
Working in professional, scientific and technical services0.06
Working in administrative and support services-0.65
Working in public administration and safety-0.22
Working in education and training-0.15
Working in healthcare and social assistance-0.07
Working in arts and recreation services0.01

Fitting with the high level of rural support for ACT are the significant positive correlations of 0.39 between voting ACT in 2020 and voting Outdoors NZ Party in 2020, and of 0.43 between voting ACT in 2020 and working in agriculture, forestry or fishing. There were also positive correlations, if not significant ones, between voting ACT in 2020 and working in mining or construction.

The most striking correlation here is the one of -0.65 between voting ACT in 2020 and working in administration and support services. This might surprise many, because ACT voters are so urbanised that one could expect heavy representation in industries that are typically urban, such as any office work.

The explanation is that ACT appeals mostly to those willing to take financial risks and to gamble, and so they tend to choose more entreprenurial industries. The choice of administration and support services is usually made by those who like to play it safe.

It is striking that such a strongly historically urban party as ACT might get more support from rural electorates in 2020 than urban ones. This speaks to the sense of betrayal that the right-leaning firearms community felt about National supporting restrictive firearms legislation. Almost all of these new, rural ACT voters will have been National voters in the previous election.

In several ways, the correlations between belonging to certain demographic categories and voting either ACT or National in 2020 are identical. Voting for either party had a correlation of 0.17 with casting a special vote for Yes in the euthanasia referendum, one of 0.58 with being aged 45-49 years old, one of -0.60 with voting for Vision NZ in 2020, and one of 0.68 with voting for the New Conservative Party in 2020.

Although the two parties have many shared sentiments, they have slight differences in some other ways.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017Voting National 2020
Median income0.200.610.23
Mean income0.23n/a0.24
Median age0.540.260.42
Mean age0.53n/a0.39

Measured by income, the average ACT voter in 2020 was about as wealthy as the average National voter in 2020. This was a sharp movement towards the middle for the average ACT voter. In 2017, the correlation between voting ACT and median income was 0.61. By 2020 it had fallen so far that it was no longer significant.

The median age of an ACT voter, by contrast, increased sharply between 2017 and 2020. In 2017 the correlation between median age and voting ACT was barely significant, at 0.26. By 2020 this correlation was much stronger, at 0.54. In fact, this correlation was so strong by 2020 that it was stronger than the one between median age and voting National.

If National is an old person’s party, that’s now even more true of ACT. This marks a striking change from the young professional image that ACT usually projects.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017
New Zealand-born-0.01-0.56

In stark contrast to earlier years, when it was possible to write of ACT that they had the lowest proportion of New Zealand-born voters of any party, the correlation between voting ACT in 2020 and being New Zealand-born was -0.01. This is because the vast majority of their new voters were elderly and rural, and those demographics tend to be New Zealand-born.

These Kiwis did not come to favour ACT for nationalist reasons, however. Most of their sentiments were driven by anger over the incompetence of both Labour and National, who both supported heavy restrictions on firearms rights in the wake of the Christchurch mosque shooting. In the wake of these restrictions, ACT gained heavily from the perception of being a libertarian party.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting National 2020Voting ACT 2017
Employed full-time0.010.040.22
Employed part-time0.500.270.07
Unemployed-0.84-0.82-0.42

One notable difference between National and ACT voters is that the former are less likely to be employed part-time. The correlation between voting National in 2020 and being employed part-time was 0.27 – for voting ACT in 2020 it was 0.50. This speaks to the degree to which the ACT voters of 2020 value community engagement – in stark contrast to earlier years.

This also reflects the fact that ACT voters were much older in 2020 than in 2017, as older people frequently cut down from full-time to part-time work in their 50s and 60s rather than become unemployed or retired. So if a demographic has a strong positive correlation with working part-time, that demographic is probably full of the sort of person who volunteers for the Rotary Club or similar institutions.

However, the essential aspirationism of the average ACT voter is as strong as ever. The correlation between voting ACT in 2020 and being unemployed was -0.84, one of the strongest negative correlations in this study. ACT voters are definitely not the sit-on-the-couch type, even less than National voters are.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting National 2020Voting ACT 2017
Work as manager0.810.780.39
Work as professional0.000.090.53
Work as technician or trades worker0.080.05-0.43
Work as community or personal service worker-0.46-0.61-0.44
Work as clerical or administrative worker-0.23-0.010.05
Work as sales worker-0.38-0.180.06
Work as machinery operator or driver-0.43-0.43-0.71
Work as labourer-0.14-0.29-0.60

In 2017, ACT appealed roughly equally to managers and professionals. The correlation between working as either and voting ACT that year was significant but not particularly strong. By 2020, there was no longer any significant correlation between voting ACT and working as a professional. The correlation between voting ACT and working as a manager, on the other hand, become one of the most strongly positive correlations of any ACT supporter: 0.81.

The changes in ACT support from 2017 to 2020 reflect that much of their new support came from the sort of person who would be most interested in firearms rights. Occupations such as technician or trades worker, machinery operator or driver and labourer are typical among the firearms enthusiast community, and the correlations between all three and voting ACT became much less negative between 2017 and 2020.

Congruent with the perception that ACT voters tend to lack empathy, few ACT voters work as community or personal service workers. The correlation between working in this occupation and voting ACT in 2020 was -0.46. Votes from this demographic tend to go to the Labour Party.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting ACT 2017
No religion0.370.07
Buddhism-0.120.55
Christianity not further defined-0.03-0.12
Hinduism-0.360.12
Islam-0.390.10
Judaism0.140.71
Maori religions-0.49-0.47
Spiritualism and New Age0.05-0.22

There was also a religious component to the pattern of ACT votes.

The correlation between having no religion and voting ACT in 2020 (0.37) was notably stronger than the correlation between having no religion and voting National in 2020 (0.16). ACT voters are less likely to be Hindus or Muslims by a similar margin. This speaks to how National has always pandered to Establishment religious sentiments whereas ACT has not.

In 2017, when ACT was a much smaller party, its voters were much more likely to be educated. This explains the strong correlations between voting ACT that year and being a Buddhist (0.55) or being a Jew (0.71), as those are two of the best-educated demographics in the country. By 2020, being a Buddhist or a Jew was much less likely to predict support for ACT.

Realistically, any party that moves from the fringe to significant electoral success will move towards the centre in most demographic measures. This is evident in many ways if one compares ACT voters in 2017 to ACT voters in 2020.

VariableVoting ACT 2020Voting National 2020Voting Greens 2020
Being male0.07-0.02-0.16

The correlations between voting ACT or Green in 2020 and being male are not particularly strong, at 0.07 and -0.16 respectively. But given the sizes of the demographics in question here, the differences are noticable. It’s not enough to say that ACT is for men and the Greens are for women, but future elections could easily entrench this division as the alternative continues to win votes from the Establishment.

In summary, from 2017 to 2020 ACT transformed. In 2017 they were a fringe party for high-income, low-empathy voters. By 2020 they had become a mainstream movement with the potential of challenging National as the de facto leader of the right wing. This was mostly due to a massive influx of old, white, rural voters.

The Four-Fold Rule that ACT appeals mostly to young men, in contrast to National’s appeal to old men and the Greens’ appeal to young women, mostly didn’t apply in 2020. The ACT Party muscled in on some of National’s traditional territory, winning many votes from older people.

The question for 2023 is whether ACT can achieve what parties in the alternative right dream of everywhere: to win enough young men to take power. It’s unlikely that ACT will win many voters from the non-voter demographic, as those tend to be poor and non-aspirational. But if ACT continues to win votes from National, ACT could become the larger of the two, and thereby the official default right-wing party.

*

This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.

*

If you enjoyed reading this essay, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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If you would like to support our work in other ways, please consider subscribing to our SubscribeStar fund. Even better, buy any one of our books!