It’s common to hear demands nowadays for something called “decolonisation”. Apparently colonisation was the worst thing that ever happened to the peoples of the New World, and justice cannot be served until it is reversed. The media, educational and political machinery of the West is fully behind pushing the term and its logic. But what is it?
Some definitions of decolonisation refer to the colonised nation becoming independent of the colonising power. But this cannot be the sense in which most people use the term, because New Zealand has been independent from Britain for decades already and there are still calls for decolonisation. So the term must mean something else.
In most discourse, ‘decolonisation’ is a synonym for white erasure. This means the systematic removal of all white people and all white culture. It means the destruction of all white institutions – whites must not be allowed to organise in any sense. It means the criminalisation of all pro-white speech, even if spoken in self-defence (see the ‘It’s Okay To Be White‘ saga for proof). It means the demonisation of whites in speech and media (as per Marama Davidson).
Understanding this, it’s possible to look back on historical examples of decolonisation to get some clues about how it works in practice.
The first major example is Haiti. The island contained the first European settlement in the Americas, founded by Christopher Columbus in 1492. The French built it into a sugarcane colony, creating immense wealth from the product of slave labour. At one point, there were some 30,000 French living there and 700,000 African slaves.
Decolonisation came in the form of the Haitian Revolution, beginning in 1791 and ending in 1804. This sentence, from Wikipedia, says it all: “On 1 January 1804, Dessalines, the new leader under the dictatorial 1805 constitution, declared Haiti a free republic in the name of the Haitian people, which was followed by the massacre of the remaining whites.”
A second major example comes from Algeria. A French colony since 1830, Algeria was considered an integral part of France for over a century. Algerian French culture was established enough that it managed to produce a mind as great as that of Albert Camus. After Algeria became independent in 1962, some 800,000 French colonials were driven to France.
The next major example is Rhodesia. The white population of Rhodesia peaked at around 300,000 in the mid-1970s. After the Rhodesian Bush War and the reformation of Rhodesia as Zimbabwe in 1980, wholesale ethnic cleansing began. Between 1980 and 1990, some two-thirds of the white population were driven overseas.
Rhodesia is, along with Haiti and Algeria, an archetypal decolonisation story, in the sense that it ended with the extermination of white settlers. Anyone who thinks that decolonisation is about equity is either dishonest or stupid. The spectre of decolonisation should, if we are thinking clearly, invoke images of mass slaughter and rape.
South Africa is the best major example of ongoing decolonisation today. Since 1993, the year of the referendum that introduced black rule, the white proportion of the population has halved, from 16% to 7.5%. Almost one million white South Africans have been driven overseas, an ethnic cleansing that surpasses Algeria in absolute numbers, if not proportion.
Decolonisation in New Zealand would likely involve a path similar to the places above. There is a sizable number of radicals, aided by the usual communists and fellow travellers, who dream of doing to white New Zealanders what was done to white people in Haiti, Kenya, Algeria, Rhodesia, South Africa and other places. Some of them are influential.
It might be argued that Maoris simply don’t have the numbers to repeat the wholesale ethnic cleansing of Haiti, Algeria or Rhodesia. That may be true, but the main principle of decolonisation is the progressive exclusion of all white people from all positions of power or influence, however long it takes. This can be enacted without needing to win any military victory.
For example, some co-governance arrangements involve a 50:50 powershare between Maori interests and non-Maori interests. This is naturally a form of white erasure because it reduces the proportion of power held by whites, from the 70% befitting their population, to less than 50%.
From there, it’s possible to disenfranchise white people further by awarding scholarships preferentially to non-whites, by reserving spaces in prestigious educational courses specifically for non-whites, requiring some proportion of Government procurement to be made with non-white businesses, funding and promoting non-white arts and media, and dozens of other tactics.
It’s easy to imagine that, after a few decades of this, the situation for New Zealand’s whites would start to look like the situation of South African whites today.
The reason why co-governance is so controversial is that New Zealand’s white majority, consciously or not, can sense that the push for it is motivated by the same sentiments that led to the extermination of white populations elsewhere. As such, resisting co-governance might prove to be a matter of survival.
Decolonisation, in practice, amounts to white erasure. It’s not a sure thing that we will ever read the phrase “massacre of the remaining whites” in the context of New Zealand. However, it’s apparent that there are radical elements in New Zealand who would like to massacre whites, and that there are powerful foreign interests who would like to encourage such a thing in order to destabilise an enemy.
The New Conservative Party had one of the strongest Internet presences of any party leading up to the 2020 General Election. They regularly scored 5%+ in online polls of voting intent. In the actual election, however, they only got 42,613 votes, or 1.5% of the total. This was not enough to win any seats in Parliament.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
Voting Labour in 2020
0.13
Voting National in 2020
0.68
Voting Greens in 2020
-0.35
Voting ACT in 2020
0.68
Voting New Zealand First in 2020
0.29
Voting TOP in 2020
-0.05
Voting Maori Party in 2020
-0.57
Voting Advance NZ in 2020
0.12
Voting ALCP in 2020
-0.31
Voting Sustainable NZ in 2020
0.37
Voting Social Credit in 2020
0.35
Voting NZ Outdoors Party in 2020
0.34
Unsurprisingly, New Conservative voters were similar to National and ACT voters. The correlations between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting National in 2020 or voting ACT in 2020 were both 0.68. This reflects that New Conservative is a right-wing party, competing for the same votes as National and ACT.
Although there was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting New Zealand First in 2020 (0.29), this was not as strong as any of the correlations between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting Sustainable NZ in 2020 (0.37), voting Social Credit in 2020 (0.35) or voting NZ Outdoors Party in 2020 (0.34).
These positive correlations seem unlikely, given that New Conservative is right-wing and New Zealand First, Sustainable NZ, Social Credit and NZ Outdoors Party are all centrist/leftist. But they can be explained by the fact that all these parties appeal to the relatively disenfranchised, and hence they share demographics on that basis.
The strongest negative correlations were between voting New Conservative in 2020 and voting Maori Party in 2020 (-0.57), voting Vision NZ Party in 2020 (-0.42), voting Greens in 2020 (-0.35) or voting Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party in 2020 (-0.31).
These correlations are easy to explain: New Conservative voters tend to be old and white, whereas Maori Party, Vision NZ Party and ALCP voters tend to be young and brown, and Greens voters tend to be young.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
European
0.50
Maori
-0.44
Pacific Islander
-0.25
Asian
-0.21
The New Conservatives made a big deal about the racial diversity of their candidates, but their constituency was solidly white. As with the National and ACT parties, there was a significant positive correlation between being of European descent and voting New Conservative in 2020 (0.50).
The negative correlation between being a Pacific Islander and voting New Conservative in 2020 (-0.25) was much weaker than the correlations between being a Pacific Islander and voting either National in 2020 (-0.46) or ACT in 2020 (-0.58). This was mostly down to two major factors: the fact that then-Deputy Leader Elliot Ikilei was conspicuously Polynesian, and the fact that the New Conservatives in general were conspicuously Christian.
The strongest negative correlation between voting New Conservative and belonging to a particular race was with Maoris, at -0.44. This can be explained by the fact that Maoris, who tend to be younger and poorer than the rest of New Zealand, have little incentive to vote for the status quo.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
No religion
0.04
Buddhism
-0.24
Christianity
0.24
Hinduism
-0.21
Islam
-0.22
Judaism
-0.36
Maori religions
-0.38
Spiritualism and New Age
0.01
Maoris and Jews share very few things in common, but one thing they do share is a significant dislike for voting New Conservative in 2020. The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and following one of the Maori religions was -0.38, and with being a Jew it was -0.36.
The only one religious group to have a positive correlation with voting for the New Conservative Party in 2020 was Christians, and even then the correlation was barely significant (0.24). The irony is that religious people, being conservative, tend to favour the status quo, and therefore they favour the status quo conservative party (National) and not the alternative conservative party (New Conservatives).
This means that the conspiciously Christian branding of the New Conservatives did little to win the votes of mainstream Christians. The Christian fringe, however, were significantly more likely to vote New Conservative in 2020 than vote for other parties.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
20-24 years old
-0.52
25-29 years old
-0.47
30-34 years old
-0.33
35-39 years old
-0.20
40-44 years old
0.01
45-49 years old
0.30
50-54 years old
0.46
55-59 years old
0.59
60-64 years old
0.63
65-69 years old
0.61
70-74 years old
0.64
75-79 years old
0.65
80-84 years old
0.65
85+ years old
0.54
Like most reactionary parties around the world, New Conservative voters were old. There was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and belonging to any age bracket above 45 years old. All of the age brackets between 60 and 84 years old had a positive correlation of at least 0.60 with voting New Conservative in 2020.
The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and belonging to a particular age bracket became more and more positive as age increases, from the 20-24 age bracket (where it is -0.52) all the way up to the 60-64 age bracket (where it is 0.63). Older age brackets were consistently strong supporters of New Conservative.
The obvious reason for this is that young people don’t like conservatism. They are much less likely to own homes or to earn a wage that they can one day buy a home with. As such, they are not incentivised to support the status quo. Moreover, young people are much less likely to be Christian.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
Being male
0.09
The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being male was not significant, at 0.09. This was however the third highest proportion of male voters of all parties. Only voting Heartland NZ in 2020 (0.11) and voting Outdoors NZ in 2020 (0.22) had stronger positive correlations with being male.
This accords with data from other countries, where conservative parties regularly get a higher proportion of male voters. This is usually because male voters tend to have higher incomes, but this is not the case for New Conservative voters. This is further evidence that New Conservative voters were motivated by social conservatism more than economic conservatism.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
Median income
-0.19
Mean income
-0.27
One major way in which New Conservative voters differ from National and ACT voters is income. There is a significant positive correlation between mean income and voting either National or ACT in 2020, but a significant negative correlation between mean income and voting New Conservative in 2020.
This suggests a paradox: New Conservative voters vote for the right-wing, which usually favours those with money, despite that New Conservative voters don’t have much money themselves. This paradox can be resolved by referencing the fact that New Conservative voters tend to be religious and so, like low-income Americans who vote for right-wing parties, they tend to be values voters.
Variable
Voting New Conservative 2020
Not studying
0.63
Wage or salary
-0.45
Interest, dividends, rent or other investments
0.29
NZ Super or Veteran’s pension
0.65
Student Allowance
-0.48
New Conservative voters might not have a high income (the correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and mean income was -0.27), but they are comfortable and secure by many measures. For example, there was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and receiving NZ Super or a Veteran’s pension (0.65) or receiving income through interest, dividends, rent or other investments (0.29).
By contrast, there was a strong negative correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and receiving a wage or salary (-0.45). This wasn’t because students vote for them either: there was a correlation of 0.63 between voting New Conservative in 2020 and not studying, and also a significant negative correlation of -0.48 between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being on the Student Allowance.
It seems that New Conservative is, to a large extent, a pensioner’s party. They seem to attract many of the conservative old people who are more Christian, rather than the more ethnonationalist, who tend to prefer New Zealand First.
Variable
Voting New Conservative 2020
Own or part own house
0.71
Neither own house nor family trust
-0.71
New Conservative voters were very likely to own their own homes – the correlation between voting for them in 2020 and owning or part-owning a house was 0.71. In this sense, New Conservative voters also suffer from the “too much time on the Internet” phenomenon that affected Advance NZ voters. This explains why both parties got so few votes in comparison to the size of their Internet presence.
The correlation between receiving NZ Super or a Veteran’s Pension and owning or part-owning a house was 0.79, one of the strongest correlations in the whole Understanding New Zealand dataset. This explains why New Conservative voters tend to own their own houses despite being low-income.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
No qualifications
0.24
Level 1 certificate
0.40
Level 2 certificate
0.25
Level 3 certificate
-0.55
Level 4 certificate
0.35
Level 5 diploma
0.37
Level 6 diploma
0.55
Bachelor’s degree
-0.31
Honours degree
-0.26
Master’s degree
-0.35
Doctorate
-0.25
As with Advance NZ, there was a significant negative correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and having any of the university degrees. These negative correlations were not as strong as they were for Advance NZ, however.
The most likely to vote New Conservative in 2020 were those with a level 6 diploma – the correlation here was 0.55. The reason for this is the strong support for the New Conservatives among tradesmen who have completed training at polytechnic – the correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being a technician or trades worker was 0.52.
That New Conservative voters might be poorly educated is not a surprise to those who have observed similar Christian fundamentalist movements in other countries. The New Conservative’s message was primarily based on fear, and fear-based messaging primarily appeals to the poorly educated. This explains the constant hysteria about homosexuality and cannabis use.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing
0.34
Working in mining
0.17
Working in manufacturing
0.24
Working in electricity, gas, water or wastewater
0.14
Working in construction
0.37
Working in wholesale trade
0.05
Working in retail trade
0.35
Working in accommodation or food services
-0.32
Working in transport, postal or warehousing
-0.25
Working in information media and telecommunications
-0.46
Working in financial and insurance services
-0.31
Working in rental, hiring and real estate services
0.06
Working in professional, scientific and technical services
-0.29
Working in administrative and support services
-0.46
Working in public administration and safety
-0.24
Working in education and training
-0.23
Working in healthcare and social assistance
0.11
Working in arts and recreation services
-0.35
Fittingly, then, the party was heavily represented among those working in masculine industries.
There was a significant positive correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working in construction (0.37) or working in agriculture, forestry and fishing (0.34). There was also a significant negative correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working in administrative and support services (-0.46), being a community and personal service worker (-0.31) or working in public administration and safety (-0.24).
These correlations don’t reflect the relatively poor educational levels of New Conservative voters so much as they reflect a particularly object-orientated social approach. New Conservative voters appear to be disinclined towards working with people, and prefer working with things. This is typical for masculine groups.
Variable
Voting New Conservative in 2020
Working as a manager
0.36
Working as a professional
-0.33
Working as a technician or trades worker
0.52
Working as a community or personal services worker
-0.31
Working as clerical or administrative worker
-0.01
Working as a sales worker
-0.09
Working as a machinery operator or driver
0.02
Working as a labourer
0.07
The occupation in which one is least likely to find a New Conservative voter is professional. The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and being a professional was significantly negative, at -0.33. This reflects multiple factors, but in particular the poor education of New Conservative voters.
The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working as a manager was significantly positive, at 0.36. This is primarily a function of two things. One, managers tend to be older than average, like New Conservative voters. Two, managers don’t need to be well-educated to perform in their roles, just committed.
Some might be suprised to read that the correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and working as a technician or trades worker (0.52) was so much stronger than the correlations between voting that was and working as as machinery operator or driver (0.02) or as a labourer (0.07) were much weaker.
This can be explained by age. New Conservative voters, as discussed above, tend to be old. Few old people can cut it as labourers, or even as machinery operators and drivers. But there are many old people working as technicians or trades workers. The trades are well-known for appealing to youngsters on account of that many of their workers will soon retire.
Variable
Voting New Conservative 2020
Has no children
-0.54
Has one child
-0.21
Has two children
0.65
Has three children
0.61
Has four children
0.26
Has five children
-0.07
Has six or more children
-0.24
The correlations between voting New Conservative in 2020 and having children are the strongest for having two children (0.65) or having three children (0.61). This is not surprising given the age of New Conservative voters. Those who have no children, or only one, tend to be much younger and less religious.
Being mostly white, New Conservative voters are significantly less likely to have six or more children. The correlation between voting New Conservative in 2020 and having six or more children was -0.24. The correlation between voting National in 2020 and having six or more children was, however, -0.59, so New Conservative voters are relatively fecund by that measure.
In summary, New Conservative voters represent a kind of old-school masculinity that perhaps hasn’t adjusted well to changing times. This is best shown by the strong negative correlation of -0.66 between voting New Conservative in 2020 and casting a special vote for Yes in the cannabis referendum.
New Conservative voters tend to be old, white, male, poorly educated and Christian. As such, they are very much the same demographic targeted by the American Republican Party in their “Southern Strategy”. Such voters are not as numerous in New Zealand as in America, but there might still be enough of them to get New Conservative over the 5% in 2023.
*
This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.
The use of cannabis in human history as a spiritual tool dates back thousands of years. In many cultures, the plant has been considered sacred and has held a significant place in religious practices. Despite its controversial status in today’s society, cannabis was once regarded as a holy sacrament, offering those who consumed it a gateway to higher spiritual states.
Cannabis has been used in various forms throughout history. Its earliest recorded uses date back to ancient China and India. In China, the plant was considered one of the “50 fundamental herbs” and was used extensively in traditional medicine. In India, cannabis was considered sacred under the name “bhang”, and it was considered an essential element of Indian religious practices.
In Hinduism, Lord Shiva is often depicted holding a “chillum”, a clay pipe used to smoke cannabis. It is believed that Shiva would consume cannabis before meditating, as it helped to quiet his mind and achieve a heightened state of consciousness.
Similarly, in the Elementalist religion, cannabis, or “ganja”, holds a central role in their spiritual practices. Elementalists believe that the plant is a sacrament, given to them by God, to promote relaxation, calmness, and increase spiritual awareness. They use it as an aid in meditation and prayer, to gain insight into their relationship with the divine and to connect with their inner selves.
Native American tribes also incorporated the use of cannabis in their spiritual rituals. The Lakota tribe, for example, used cannabis as part of their vision quests. During these quests, individuals would consume cannabis to enter a trance-like state and seek guidance from the spirit world.
In addition to spiritual practices, cannabis has played a crucial role in modern religions such as Elementalism and the Church of the Universe. These religions view cannabis as a means of connecting with the divine and achieving a higher state of consciousness.
The spiritual use of cannabis is not limited to religious practices. It has also been used as a tool for self-exploration and personal growth. Many individuals who consume cannabis report experiencing feelings of euphoria, a sense of connectedness with the universe, and heightened creativity. These experiences often lead individuals to question their place in the world and their relationship with the divine.
However, it is important to note that the spiritual use of cannabis is not without controversy. Some argue that the plant’s psychoactive properties can lead to abuse and addiction, ultimately hindering an individual’s spiritual development through creating an attachment to the material world.
Despite these criticisms, the spiritual use of cannabis persists among many individuals and religious communities around the world. In recent years, there has been a growing movement to legalise cannabis, driven in part by those who view its use as a spiritual right.
This movement has gained momentum as more individuals and communities have begun to recognize the therapeutic benefits of cannabis. The plant is now used to treat a variety of medical conditions such as chronic pain, epilepsy, and anxiety. As more research is conducted on its potential as a therapeutic tool, it is possible that the spiritual use of cannabis will become more widely accepted and recognized.
In conclusion, the spiritual use of cannabis in human history is a complex topic. For many cultures and religions, cannabis was considered a sacred plant capable of promoting spiritual growth and personal development. Although it is mostly prohibited today, many millions still use it to gain spiritual insight.
*
Vince McLeod is the author of The Case For Cannabis Law Reform, the comprehensive collection of arguments for ending cannabis prohibition.
Many thought that holding a cannabis referendum at the same time as a General Election would lead to a surge in support for the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party. In the end, they only got 13,329 votes, or around 0.5% of the party vote. This chapter explain why a hundred times more people voted for cannabis law reform than for the cannabis party.
It will be surprising for many to hear that there wasn’t much overlap between those who voted ALCP in 2020 and those who cast a special vote for Yes in the cannabis referendum- the correlation between the two groups was 0.23. This was statistically significant, but only barely so, and is much weaker than many other correlations with voting ALCP in 2020.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
No qualifications
0.55
Level 1 certificate
0.55
Level 2 certificate
0.64
Level 3 certificate
0.37
Level 4 certificate
0.53
Level 5 diploma
0.36
Level 6 diploma
-0.56
Bachelor’s degree
-0.56
Honours degree
-0.55
Master’s degree
-0.53
Doctorate
-0.44
The trend here is obvious: the better-educated a person is, the less likely they were to vote ALCP in 2020. This is similar to previous elections. What this trend reveals is that the ALCP is seen as a joke party by the vast majority of the electorate, and people only vote for them if they feel that their vote doesn’t matter.
In this regard, a vote for the ALCP is similar to not voting, in that it follows the General Disenfranchisement Rule. The ALCP is something of a joke party and so, like not voting, it tends to appeal to those who feel that their vote doesn’t matter anyway. We can predict from this that the demographics of ALCP voters are very similar to the demographics of non-voters.
These correlations explain why the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and special voting Yes in the cannabis referendum was only 0.23. The more poorly-educated a person is, the more likely they are to vote ALCP, but the better-educated a person was, the more likely they were to special vote Yes in the cannabis referendum.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
European
-0.08
Maori
0.88
Pacific Islander
-0.05
Asian
-0.53
Indeed, we can see an extremely strong correlation of 0.88 between being Maori and voting ALCP in 2020. Kiwis of European descent and Pacific Islanders were generally neutral about voting ALCP, and Asians were strongly against it. These patterns mirror the numbers of poorly-educated and disenfranchised people among those racial groups.
For many Maori people, the Establishment is implacably opposed to them and so it doesn’t matter who they vote for. This is why so many of them either don’t vote or vote for protest parties like the ALCP. Their high levels of support for the ALCP could be considered a consequence of general disenfranchisement.
However, it isn’t just a protest vote. Maori people are much more heavily affected by cannabis prohibition than other races, on account of that they are much more likely to use it as a recreational alternative to alcohol in comparison to all of whites, Pacific Islanders and Asians. Moreover, the relative insecurity of dwelling suffered by Maori people means that they are more likely to use cannabis in public, and thereby more likely to suffer legal consequences.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
Voting Labour in 2020
-0.27
Voting National in 2020
-0.60
Voting Greens in 2020
-0.23
Voting ACT in 2020
-0.48
Voting New Zealand First in 2020
0.38
Voting New Conservative in 2020
-0.31
Voting The Opportunities Party in 2020
-0.34
Voting Maori Party in 2020
0.81
Voting Advance NZ in 2020
0.68
Voting Sustainable NZ in 2020
-0.41
One pattern immediately leaps out when we look at the correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting for other parties: all of the correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting for one of the four major globalist parties is significantly negative.
The most negative of all was the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting National in 2020: this was -0.60. The ALCP-voting demographics differ from the National-voting demographics in several major ways, as this chapter will discuss.
Some might be surprised to see that the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting Greens in 2020 was -0.23. The ALCP is considered by many to be a Greens-adjacent party, on account of that the cannabis law reform issue has been pushed by the Greens more than by any other party. But the only major quality shared by both Greens and ALCP voters is that they tend to be young.
Those surprised at that will likely also be surprised by the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting New Zealand First in 2020, which was 0.38. This reflects a shared tendency for ALCP and New Zealand First voters to be both Maori and poorly educated.
The heavy Maori support for the ALCP also explains why there are strong correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting Maori Party in 2020 (0.81) or voting Advance NZ in 2020 (0.68).
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
Median income
-0.28
Mean income
-0.26
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
<$5,000
0.01
$5,000-$10,000
0.25
$10,000-$20,000
0.58
$20,000-$30,000
0.33
$30,000-$50,000
0.23
$50,000-$70,000
-0.36
$70,000+
-0.51
Fitting with the general theme of disenfranchisement, ALCP voters are considerably poorer than the average voter. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and median income was -0.28. This is actually wealthier than would be predicted from their education level, but still significantly poorer than the New Zealand average.
The most positive correlation between voting ALCP and belonging to a particular income bracket was the $10,000-$20,000 “beneficiary” bracket, which was 0.58. The most negative correlation between voting ALCP and belonging to a particular income bracket was the $70,000+ bracket, which was -0.51.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
New Zealand-born
0.69
Disenfranchisement is only very rarely imported to New Zealand. The vast majority of people at the bottom of our society are home grown. This may sound strange, especially to those who follow the narrative that being an immigrant automatically makes a person a member of an oppressed group.
The reality is that New Zealand-born people make up the vast bulk of those doing bad, and ALCP voters are often among these.
On the surface, it seems paradoxical to have a situation where highly-educated people voted in favour of cannabis law reform in the referendum, but mostly poorly-educated people voted in favour of the cannabis law reform party at the 2020 General Election.
The explanation is that the ALCP is something of a joke vote for people who aren’t serious. Many people feel that their party vote is worthless anyway, on account of that the Establishment will always win, so they protest by casting a vote for the ALCP. These sentiments did not apply to the cannabis referendum, where many people felt that they had an opportunity to stick it to the Establishment by voting for freedom.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
Living in an urban electorate
-0.39
Living on the North Island
-0.04
ALCP voters are more likely to be rural dwellers than urban ones – the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and living in an urban electorate was . There are several possible reasons for this. The most obvious is the large Maori proportion of ALCP voters, because Maori people tend to live rurally. Another likely reason is that, because cannabis is currently illegal, people who grow it prefer to operate away from high concentrations of potential noticers.
The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and living on the North Island was not only not significant, it was negative. This will surprise those who thought that most ALCP voters are gang members from Hastings and Napier. The truth is that the ALCP gets a lot of votes from hippies and “Dark Green” environmentalists, as well as doomsday preppers, and many of those live in rural South Island.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
No religion
0.29
Is Buddhist
-0.57
Is Christian
-0.35
Is Hindu
-0.41
Is Jew
-0.39
Is Muslim
-0.41
Is follower of a Maori religion
0.72
Is Spiritualist or New Ager
0.35
We can see even more evidence of heavy Maori support for cannabis law reform when looking at the correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and being a follower of a Maori religion, which was 0.72. This was much stronger than any other correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and religious affiliation.
The next most positive correlation was the one between voting ALCP in 2020 and being a Spiritualist or New Ager, which was 0.35. The explanation for this is not as obvious as the one for Maori religions, but comes down to the fact that New Agers in particular consider cannabis to be a spiritual sacrament and its prohibition a moral obscenity.
There was also a significant positive correlation of 0.29 between voting ALCP in 2020 and having no religion. This will surprise those who are aware that people with no religion tend to be better-educated than those with a religion, and that ALCP voters tend to be poorly educated. The explanation is that most of the prejudice against cannabis users comes from religious people, who see cannabis use as a rival spiritual practice.
In the case of Christians, this represents a significant antipathy towards cannabis users (see Chapter 11). In the case of the followers of the religions not yet mentioned (particularly Jews), it reflects the fact that the ALCP is a joke party in the minds of many, and followers of Asian religions tend to take their votes seriously.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
Employed full-time
-0.25
Employed part-time
0.12
Unemployed
0.64
Few will be surprised by the strong positive correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and being unemployed – this was 0.64. Unemployment is correlated with many other variables that are themselves correlated with voting ALCP in 2020, such as being young, being Maori or being poorly educated.
The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and being employed part-time will surprise many, on account of that ALCP voters are stereotyped as non-workers. But, as with other disenfranchised demographics, ALCP voters often find themselves working part-time to make ends meet. Many ALCP voters on the Supported Living Payment or the Sole Parent Payment will fall into this category.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
No source of income
-0.06
Earning a wage or salary
-0.00
Being self-employed or owning one’s own business
-0.35
Receiving interest, dividends, rent or other investment income
-0.58
Receiving ACC or private work insurance
0.70
Receiving NZ Super or Veteran’s pension
-0.19
Receiving JobSeeker Support
0.77
Receiving Sole Parent Support
0.77
Receiving Supported Living Payment
0.55
Receiving Student Allowance
0.03
Some might think that, because many ALCP voters are young and because the ALCP is something of a protest party, that many students would support them. This is not the case. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and receiving a Student Allowance was a mere 0.03. This is probably because cannabis law reform is mostly an issue for those doing it tough, and tertiary students tend to be middle-class.
The two least disenfranchised categories of benefit recipients are pensioners and students. This is because pensioners usually own their own homes, and students are usually middle-class and only temporarily poor while they are young. Following from this, neither of the correlations between being either on a pension or on a student allowance and voting ALCP in 2020 were statistically significant.
The strongest correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and any income type were with receiving JobSeeker Support and receiving Sole Parent Support. Both were 0.77. This paints a picture of the ALCP as a party for those who feel excluded by society to some extent, the true protest vote in contrast with Greens and ACT.
Supporting this contention are the strong correlations between voting ALCP in 2020 and receiving a Supported Living Payment (0.55) and receiving ACC or private work insurance (0.70). The mentally and physically damaged people in these categories are the ones most likely to have discovered the medicinal properties of cannabis.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
Working as a manager
-0.31
Working as a professional
-0.48
Working as a technician or trades worker
0.21
Working as a community or personal services worker
0.57
Working as a clerical or administrative worker
-0.36
Working as a sales worker
-0.14
Working as a machinery operator or driver
0.37
Working as a labourer
0.59
When examining the occupations of ALCP voters, some patterns are evident that are the reverse of patterns of people who voted Yes in the cannabis referendum. This goes a long way to explain why there was such a weak correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and voting Yes in the cannabis referendum.
Unlike with voting Yes in the cannabis referendum, the more disenfranchised a demographic is the more likely they were to vote ALCP in 2020. The reasons for this are complex.
Simply put, many disenfranchised General Election voters don’t feel that they have a realistic chance of influencing the election, so they throw their vote to a joke/protest party. On the other hand, voters in the cannabis referendum felt enfranchised, and felt like they did have a realistic chance of influencing the outcome, so they acted more seriously, and voted Yes.
Variable
Voting ALCP in 2020
Working in agriculture, forestry or fishing
0.26
Working in mining
0.20
Working in manufacturing
0.27
Working in electricity, gas, water and wastewater services
0.25
Working in construction
0.36
Working in wholesale trade
-0.34
Working in retail trade
0.02
Working in accommodation or food services
0.02
Working in transport, postal or warehousing
0.35
Working in information media or telecommunications
-0.37
Working in financial or insurance services
-0.45
Working in rental, hiring or real estate services
-0.38
Working in professional, scientific or technical services
-0.49
Working in administrative or support services
0.13
Working in public administration and safety
-0.02
Working in education and training
-0.06
Working in healthcare or social assistance
0.04
Working in arts or recreation services
-0.04
As with occupations, a familiar pattern presents itself with industries. The more enfranchised workers in any given industry tend to be, the less likely they tend to vote ALCP.
The industries peopled by those who usually take their lives seriously don’t vote ALCP often. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and industry was significantly negative in the case of working in professional, scientific or technical services (-0.49), financial or insurance services (-0.45), rental, hiring or real estate services (-0.38), information media or telecommunications (-0.37) or wholesale trade (-0.34).
Industries peopled by those who tend to have less ambition, by contrast, show the opposite pattern. The correlation between voting ALCP in 2020 and industry was significantly positive in the case of working in construction (0.36), transport, postal or warehousing (0.35), manufacturing (0.27), agriculture, forestry or fishing (0.26) or electricity, gas, water and wastewater (0.25).
This lays bare the reality of the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party: it’s not seen as a serious Parliamentary option, and so mostly attracts votes from protest voters. This is the reason why most demographics vote very differently when it comes to General Elections on the one hand, and cannabis law reform referendums on the other.
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This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.
