Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted TOP in 2020

Surprisingly for many, TOP went backwards between 2017 and 2020, from 2.4% of the vote (63,261 votes) to 1.5% of the vote (43,449 votes). This was despite the fact that, this time, they had a charming and personable leader in Geoff Simmons.

The major problem facing TOP is that they appear to be a Green Party B team made up of those too weird or too unprofessional to represent a Parliamentary party. As such, they have no real niche.

Their voting bloc is extremely similar to the Green Party voting bloc. Voting Greens in 2020 and voting TOP in 2020 had a correlation of 0.84. This was much stronger than the correlation between voting for any other party in 2020 and voting TOP in 2020.

Significant positive correlations also existed between voting TOP in 2020 and voting Labour in 2020 (0.33) and voting Sustainable NZ in 2020 (0.32). All these results place TOP firmly among the left.

The strongest negative correlations were between voting TOP in 2020 and voting for one of the parties with many poorly-educated brown supporters. The correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and voting for Vision NZ Party in 2020 was -0.38; with voting for Advance NZ in 2020 it was -0.36; with voting for the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party or Maori Party in 2020 it was -0.34.

The correlations between having a university degree and voting either TOP or Greens in 2020 are almost identical – and they are identical in the case of having a doctorate and voting either TOP or Greens in 2020 (0.77). The correlations between having no academic qualifications and voting either TOP or Greens in 2020 were also identical (-0.64).

The largest differences here between TOP and Greens are with those at level 3 and those at level 6. TOP is significantly weaker than the Greens among voters at level 3, and significantly stronger than the Greens among voters at level 6. Voters at level 3 are usually at university, having completed high school and moved on. Voters at level 6 have usually completed a tertiary qualification at polytech level.

This suggests that TOP is more polytech in comparison to the Greens’ university, more working-class to the Greens’ middle-class. This revelation might serve to guide future TOP policy.

TOP is a much whiter party than the Greens. The correlation between being of European descent and voting Greens in 2020 was not significant, but the correlation between being of European descent and voting TOP in 2020 was 0.41.

Maoris and Pacific Islanders, for their part, were both much less likely to vote TOP in 2020 than to vote Greens in 2020. There was a significant negative correlation between being either Maori or Pacific Islander and voting TOP in 2020. This may be because both groups feel like they are already well-represented by the Labour Party. Asians were almost perfectly indifferent to TOP.

TOP voters are strikingly older than Greens voters, especially in the upper age brackets. Although the correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and median age is negative (-0.15), it isn’t significantly negative as it is between voting Greens in 2020 and median age (-0.24).

The main difference is that TOP voters are more equally represented across all age brackets. There are significant positive correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and being in any age bracket under 35, but the correlations between voting Greens in 2020 and being in any of those age brackets are all stronger.

By contrast, the correlations between voting TOP in 2020 and belonging to any age bracket above 69 were all positive (if not significant). These correlations were all negative for voting Greens in 2020. The overall difference in support for TOP and Greens between the various age brackets is probably because TOP has a heavier online presence, especially a FaceBook presence (which appeals to old people), while the Greens have a heavier presence at universities.

Curiously, there was a significant positive correlation between voting TOP in 2020 and being female (0.24). This could be because a majority of elderly people in New Zealand are female.

Although there is a significant negative correlation between having two children and voting Green in 2020 (-0.30), the corresponding correlation with voting TOP in 2020 was much weaker (-0.04). On the other hand, the correlation between having no children and voting Greens in 2020 (0.75) was much stronger than the correlation between having no children and voting TOP in 2020 (0.57).

All of this suggests that TOP voters are generally less exceptional and more representative of the mainstream than Greens voters. This is despite that the correlation between working as a professional and voting TOP in 2020 (0.73) is barely different to the correlation between working as a professional and voting Green in 2020 (0.75).

So the truth is that TOP voters aren’t any less intelligent or competent than Greens voters, but they are more representative of ordinary people. Unsurprisingly, then, there is no significant correlation between being foreign-born and voting for TOP in 2020 (0.19) when there is a significant correlation between being foreign-born and voting Greens in 2020 (0.24).

The most surprising correlation is between owning or part-owning a house and voting TOP in 2020 – this was 0.05, much more positive than the -0.19 between owning or part-owning a house and voting Greens in 2020. This is mostly a function of the fact that TOP voters are significantly older than Greens voters, because homeownership rates increase sharply as age increases.

It’s also a function of another correlation that will surprise many – the negative correlation of -0.15 between living on the North Island and voting TOP in 2020. It’s easier to own a home on the South Island because houses are cheaper, but, despite that the housing crisis is not as desperate there, South Islanders are more willing to vote TOP. This suggests that many TOP voters cast their vote out of concern for the national housing situation, and not out of mere self-interest.

This article is an excerpt from the upcoming 3rd Edition of Understanding New Zealand, by Dan McGlashan and published by VJM Publishing. Understanding New Zealand is the comprehensive guide to the demographics and voting patterns of the New Zealand people.

If you enjoyed reading this essay/article, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted National In 2020

The 2020 General Election was a disaster for National. Their vote count collapsed from 1,152,075 (44.4%) to 738,275 (25.6%). This catastrophic result saw National with no chance of negotiating their way into government.

National lost voters in two major directions. Not only did they lose votes to their fellow right-wing party ACT, but they also lost votes across the centre to Labour.

Although National never got many votes from young people (the correlation between voting National in 2017 and being aged 20-29 was significantly negative), they got even fewer in 2020. Young New Zealand voters followed the general trend of drifting away from conservative parties between 2017 and 2020.

One pattern here is very striking: support for National rises as age rises, up until the 50-54 year old age bracket, at which point it levels off. National support increases the most quickly between ages 30-45, because this is the age in which the largest number make the transition from renter to homeowner, and therefore from a victim of the Establishment to a beneficiary of it.

People in the age brackets where homeownership is very high, i.e. those aged 50 or above, are solidly National supporters. The correlation between voting National in 2020 and owning one’s own home in a family trust was 0.81, and with owning or part owning one’s own home outright it was 0.56. The correlation between voting National in 2020 and neither owning one’s home in a family trust nor outright was -0.75.

The reason for this is obvious: National is more interested in taxing labour than capital, so those who own a lot of capital vote National out of self-interest. The New Zealand homeowner can rest assured that the National Party will never impose a capital gains tax nor a land tax. They are very much the representatives of accumulated capital.

The ongoing and worsening housing crisis is probably the foremost reason that National lost many younger voters, but maintained their position among the middle-aged. After all, the more arduous and difficult it is for a young person to get into a house, the more cruisy and luxurious life is for those who own the houses.

If Labour are the established party of the working class, National are the established party of the Establishment.

If National is the party of the Establishment, then they predictably get a lot of votes from white people. In 2020, the correlation between voting National and being of European descent was 0.53. This is strong enough to suggest that the vast majority of National support comes from white people.

Support for National sank noticeably among Pacific Islanders and Asians, however. Asians are almost completely indifferent to National, and Pacific Islanders now dislike National almost as much as Maoris do. It’s possible that National becomes more and more a white person’s party over time.

The National Party isn’t just the party of those holding wealth, it’s also the party of those earning it. There were significant correlations between voting National in 2020 and having a personal income of over $50,000 per year. The correlation between voting National in 2020 and having a personal income of over $70,000 was 0.41.

However, the correlations between being wealthy and voting National were not as strong as the correlations between being old and voting National, and the correlation between earning over $70,000 and voting for a party was stronger for the Greens (0.52) than it was for National. This speaks to the degree to which votes for National are often cast for reasons of social conservatism.

On the subject of social conservatism, this has traditionally been where National got a lot of its voters. Christians are generally happy to have homosexuals, prostitutes and cannabis users locked up in prison for moral reasons, and to that end they tend to vote National.

In 2017, the correlation between voting National and being Christian was 0.33. But by 2020 this had fallen to 0.10. Support for National also fell between 2017 and 2020 among Buddhists (0.20 to 0.12), Hindus (-0.06 to -0.14) and Muslims (-0.10 to -0.19). These voters probably didn’t switch because of moral reasons, but because of the poor example National set with their multiple changes of leadership.

In 2017 National and Labour were heavily polarised, and appealed to very different demographics. The correlation between voting National in 2017 and voting Labour in 2017 was -0.94, suggesting that there was very little overlap between the two voting blocs.

By 2020, the correlation between voting National and voting Labour was -0.16. This was because so many elderly, rich, white, Christian voters switched to Labour that there was no longer any significant difference between the voters of the two parties. National was still older, richer, whiter – but not by anywhere near as much.

So many old, rich, white people abandoned National for ACT in 2020 that the correlation between voting for either party in 2020 was 0.92. In 2017 this correlation was only 0.61.

There were also strong correlations between voting National in 2020 and voting New Conservative in 2020 (0.68) or voting Sustainable NZ in 2020 (0.50).

Significant negative correlations existed between voting National in 2020 and voting Maori Party in 2020 (-0.71), voting Vision NZ in 2020 or voting Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party in 2020 (both -0.60). These parties have a young, poor and brown demographic and are therefore different to the National-voting demographic in several major ways.

None of the correlations between voting National in 2020 and voting for the other parties in 2020 were significant, which speaks to the degree that National is a middle-of-the-road party.

If you enjoyed reading this essay, you can get a compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2019 from Amazon for Kindle or Amazon for CreateSpace (for international readers), or TradeMe (for Kiwis). A compilation of the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2018 and the Best VJMP Essays and Articles of 2017 are also available.

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Is The Fiat Currency System Collapsing?

BitCoin enthusiasts have been overjoyed in recent months to observe the rise of their favourite cryptocurrency against the US Dollar. The price of BitCoin recently touched USD40,000 earlier today, making predictions of an eventual six-figure value seem believable. But the good news for BitCoin holders might herald bad news for everyone else. This could be the collapse of the fiat currency system.

The rise in the price of BitCoin has to be understood in the wider economic context.

Ever since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007, Western governments have taken to what is known as quantitative easing. This involves the widespread printing of fiat currency, a practice that has seen the price of everything go up. New Zealand recently increased the Quantitative Easing limits to $100 billion, up from $60 billion, meaning that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand will help to fund the Government through buying bonds.

Almost 24% of all US Dollars in existence have been created over the past 12 months. This money printing has led to a much greater supply of money in circulation, which means one thing: inflation. The fiat currencies of the world are rapidly becoming worthless. This is evident when comparing their value to housing, bullion and BitCoin.

In New Zealand, the average house price has doubled since 2009, but wages have only gone up 40% since then. The average house cost ($330,000/$25) 13,200 hours of labour at the average wage in 2009. By 2020, it cost ($700,000/$34) 20,600 hours. So measured in house-buying terms, the average wage has lost 50% of its power since the Global Financial Crisis.

This is despite that fact that the value of housing stock has served as a kind of heat sink that has taken the steam out of the economy. That sink has now absorbed all the energy that it can. The extra is manifesting as inflation.

The rise in the price of silver bullion is even more striking. Silver bullion has doubled in value since April 2020. The reason for this is mostly uncertainty around fiat currency (the last time silver bullion spiked was in the immediate aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis). Silver has traditionally been seen as an alternative to fiat currency owing to its millennia of trade use.

It’s a similar story with gold bullion, the price of which has tripled since the Global Financial Crisis.

Most striking of all is the price of BitCoin. At the time of writing this article, the price of BitCoin had gone up 30% over the previous week. It had gone up 500% over the previous nine months. BitCoin has gained fame as a digital alternative to fiat currency, owing to the fact that it is not under centralised control.

Many people have predicted that BitCoin will take over once the fiat currency system collapses completely. It will be evident when this is happening, apparently, from a sustained spike in the BitCoin price. Well, there’s a spike in the BitCoin price right now, as well as a spike in the silver price, the gold price and the house price.

All of these trends point unmistakably to one conclusion: the fiat currency system is collapsing. This isn’t surprising to those who were already aware of the life cycle of fiat currencies. Soon, fiat currencies might be worth so little that some people refuse to take them in trade. Then the shit will hit the fan.

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Understanding New Zealand 3: Who Voted ACT in 2020?

The ACT Party won a mere 13,075 votes in 2017, barely more than the joke parties. But in 2020 it won 219,031 votes. This 16-fold increase radically changed the composition of the ACT voting demographic.

The main reason for the massive increase in ACT support was wealthy, old white people abandoning the National Party, but not abandoning the right wing. The correlation between being of European descent and voting ACT in 2017 was not significant, at 0.17. By 2020 this correlation had leapt to 0.74, which means that ACT now has the whitest supporters of any registered party, even whiter than New Conservatives.

That these voters came predominantly from National is apparent when one looks at the strength of the correlation between voting National in 2020 and voting ACT in 2020: 0.92. This is much stronger than in 2017, when it was 0.61, or 2014, when it was 0.40. In 2020, ACT voters and National voters were basically the same sort of people.

In fact, the correlation between voting ACT in 2020 and voting National in 2020 is so strong that the two voting demographics are close to identical. There were also strong correlations between voting ACT in 2020 and voting for the other parties whose demographics are wealthy, old and white (i.e. enfranchised), such as New Conservative (0.68) and Sustainable NZ (0.54).

Unsurprisingly, then, there were strong negative correlations between voting ACT and voting for the young and brown parties, such as the Maori Party (-0.64) Vision NZ (-0.60) and ALCP (-0.48).

The ACT Party also got much older. In 2014, the correlation between median age and voting ACT was 0.02. By 2017, it had increased to 0.26. By 2020, it had increased to 0.54 – stronger than the correlation between median age and voting National that year.

Most notably, the correlation between voting ACT in 2017 and being aged 65+ was 0.11, but the correlations between voting ACT in 2020 and belonging to any age bracket above 65 were all at least 0.63. The ACT demographic of today is much, much older than the demographic of even a few years back. Whether this reflects a permanent shift or just a temporary change in sentiments remains to be seen.

The easy assumption up until now was that the ACT Party appealed to a younger, more educated and more liberal demographic than National. This assumption used to be accurate, but by 2020 it no longer was. The ACT Party got so many votes from core National supporters that the two voting blocs are barely distinguishable when it comes to age, race, education or wealth. Even the correlations between casting a special vote for Yes in the cannabis referendum

One of the main reasons for the increase in ACT support was their support of firearms rights. Many of the new ACT voters were rural firearms enthusiasts. This is evident from the fact that the correlation between living in an urban electorate and voting ACT switched from a significantly positive correlation in 2017 (0.37) to a borderline significantly negative correlation of -0.23 in 2020.

Fitting with the high level of rural support for ACT are the significant positive correlations of 0.39 between voting ACT in 2020 and voting Outdoors NZ Party in 2020, and of 0.43 between voting ACT in 2020 and working in agriculture, forestry or fishing. There were also positive correlations, if not significant ones, between voting ACT in 2020 and working in mining or construction.

The most striking correlation here is the one of -0.65 between voting ACT in 2020 and working in administration and support services. The reason for this is likely because ACT appeals mostly to those willing to take financial risks and to gamble, whereas the choice of administration and support services as an industry is usually made by those who like to play it safe.

That such a strongly historically urban party such as ACT might get more support from rural electorates than urban ones is striking, and speaks to the sense of betrayal that the right-leaning firearms community felt about National supporting restrictive firearms legislation. Almost all of these new, rural ACT voters will have been National voters in the previous election.

In several ways, the correlations between belonging to certain demographic categories and voting either ACT or National in 2020 are identical. Voting for either party had a correlation of 0.17 with casting a special vote for Yes in the euthanasia referendum, one of 0.58 with being aged 45-49 years old, one of -0.60 with voting for Vision NZ in 2020, and one of 0.68 with voting for the New Conservative Party in 2020.

The two parties have slight differences in some other ways.

In stark contrast to earlier years, when it was possible to write of ACT that they had the lowest proportion of New Zealand-born voters of any party, the correlation between voting ACT in 2020 and being New Zealand-born was -0.01. This is because the vast majority of their new elderly and rural supporters were New Zealand-born.

One notable difference between National and ACT voters is that the former are less likely to be employed part-time. The correlation between voting National in 2020 and being employed part-time was 0.27 – for voting ACT in 2020 it was 0.50. This speaks to the degree to which the ACT voters of 2020 value community engagement – in stark contrast to earlier years.

There is also a religious component. The correlation between having no religion and voting ACT in 2020 (0.37) was notably stronger than the correlation between having no religion and voting National in 2020 (0.16). ACT voters are less likely to be Hindus or Muslims by a similar margin. This speaks to how National has always pandered to Establishment religious sentiments whereas ACT has not.

In summary, from 2017 to 2020 ACT transformed. In 2017 they were a fringe party for Chinese takeaway shop owners. By 2020 they had become a mainstream movement with the potential of challenging National as the de facto leader of the right wing.

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